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I. INTRODUCTION
First, all water is interrelated and interdependent. If groundwater were red,
most streams would be various shades of pink; if groundwater were poisoned,
the streams would also be poisoned.
2
I find it curious that although regulation of surface waters is properly a re-
sponsibility of the State, groundwater regulation is somehow viewed as a "lo-
cal" concern.... The result is uncoordinated administration of interrelated
resources.
3
Nebraska water law is on a collision course with reality. For de-
cades Nebraska judges and water policy makers have ignored the hy-
drologic connection between surface water and tributary groundwater,
the groundwater that provides the stream's base flow. External
events, including federal endangered species requirements and the
Republican River Basin Compact litigation, are forcing Nebraska
water policymakers to acknowledge and begin dealing with interre-
lated surface water and groundwater. Pending litigation between
competing surface water and groundwater irrigators in the North
Platte River basin will also force the Nebraska Supreme Court to re-
consider its 1966 decision that hydrologically interrelated surface
water and groundwater supplies need not be legally interrelated. The
plaintiff asserts that groundwater irrigators are pumping tributary
groundwater, preventing it from reaching the stream, and drying up
his surface water irrigation rights.
The basic premise of this Article is that the use of tributary
groundwater must be integrated into surface water law. Tributary
groundwater is a major contributor to the flow of most Nebraska
streams. Tributary groundwater withdrawals will, in the long run,
deplete streamflow on an almost gallon-per-gallon basis.4 Ultimately,
Nebraska must completely integrate and coordinate the law governing
2. Richard S. Harnsberger, Jarrett C. Oeltjen & Ralph J. Fischer, Groundwater:
From Windmills to Comprehensive Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179, 183
(1973).
3. Joseph L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269, 301 (2003) (quoting Ronald B. Robie, Carley v.
Porter Memorial Luncheon Address, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH BIENNIAL
CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 137, 146 (Frank T. Bragg ed., 1973)). Mr. Robie
is a California appellate judge and former director of the California Department
of Water Resources.
4. Further:
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tributary groundwater withdrawals with surface water law. Where
tributary groundwater withdrawals are significantly depleting
streamflows, tributary groundwater withdrawals must be reduced, or
appropriations to the depleted streams may need to be purchased or
retired, or both. Fortunately, in response to federal and interstate re-
quirements, much of the needed legislative action has been taken.
But judicial steps must also be taken to complete the legal framework
for integrating tributary groundwater into the appropriation system.
This Article focuses on how western courts have dealt with dis-
putes over interrelated surface water and groundwater. Part II deals
with hydrologic dimensions and related water uses. Parts III and IV
deal with early groundwater and tributary groundwater decisions of
English courts and American courts in eastern states. Part V deals
with selected groundwater and tributary groundwater decisions from
western states. Part VI deals with the evolving Nebraska law which
regulates conflicts over the use of interrelated surface water and
groundwater.
II. HYDROLOGIC AND WATER USE FUNDAMENTALS
A. Surface Water Law Fundamentals
Because it is impossible to escape legal concepts even when dis-
cussing hydrologic principles, a brief lesson in surface water law ter-
minology is needed. At common law, surface water rights are based
on the riparian rights doctrine: only owners of land bordering the
stream (riparian land) are entitled to use streamflow. Under the older
natural flow doctrine, water could be diverted only for domestic pur-
poses, so that downstream riparians would have the benefit of the
streamflow to turn their mill wheels. The natural flow doctrine was
replaced by the reasonable use doctrine, which allows significant di-
versions and requires a comparison of the competing riparian uses
when shortages occur. 5 The major surface water law doctrine in the
West is prior appropriation. Under the prior appropriation doctrine,
This hypothetical withdrawal of water from a shallow aquifer that dis-
charges into a nearby surface-water body is a simplified but compelling
illustration of the concept that ground water and surface water are one
resource. In the long term, the quantity of ground water withdrawn is
approximately equal to the reduction in streamflow that is potentially
available to downstream users.
Thomas C. Winter et al., Ground Water and Surface Water: A Single Resource,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR No. 1139, 14 (1998) (emphasis added), avail-
able at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/circ/circll39.pdf.
5. See generally RICHARD S. HARNSBERGER & NORMAN W. THORSON, NEBRASKA
WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ch. 2 (1984) (discussing historical and modern
riparian water rights); A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES
ch. 3 (Marie-Joy Paredes & John J. Sullivan eds., Release No. 15 2003) (discuss-
ing the common law of riparian water rights).
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water rights are acquired, not as an incident of land ownership, but by
diverting water from a stream for beneficial use. Conflicts are gener-
ally resolved on the basis of priority: the earliest or senior appropria-
tor has a better right over subsequent or junior appropriators. In its
modern version, appropriative water rights are acquired by applying
to the state water administrator, traditionally referred to as the State
Engineer. Priority is established when the application is received by
the State Engineer, and is "perfected" (completed) when water is ulti-
mately used. In some western states, senior appropriators may re-
quest priority administration from the State Engineer by placing a
priority call. The State Engineer's office will shut off diversions by
sufficient upstream junior appropriators until there is sufficient
streamflow for the senior.6
B. The Nature of the Groundwater Resource 7
Both surface water (the water in lakes, rivers and streams) and
groundwater (the water stored in groundwater reservoirs called aqui-
fers) are ultimately derived from precipitation. Rainfall and melting
snow form overland runoff, a significant source of streamflow. Some
precipitation soaks into the ground, slowly moving laterally until it
either drains into a stream, or percolates downward, where it becomes
part of the groundwater aquifer. The process of groundwater storage
is slow, since, in the West, natural recharge is only a few acre-inches8
per year. When the storage capacity of an aquifer is reached, ground-
6. Regarding prior appropriation, see generally HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra
note 5, ch. 3; TARLOCK, supra note 5, ch. 5.
7. This section is adapted from J. David Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and
Administration, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917, 921-22 (1980). See also TARLOCK, supra
note 5, ch. 2, §§ 4:2-4:5 (examining the hydrologic cycle in relation to water use);
Peter N. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189,
193-98 (1972) (comparing the hydrologic relationship between groundwater and
surface water); Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of
Subflow: Arizona's Futile Effort to Separate Groundwater from Surface Water, 36
ARIz. L. REV. 567, 574-84 (1994) [hereinafter Glennon & Maddock, Subflow]
(discussing general principles in hydrogeology); Robert Jerome Glennon &
Thomas Maddock, III, The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of
Stream/Aquifer Interactions, 43 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, § 22.02 (1997)
[hereinafter Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions] (discussing the
hydrologic interaction between groundwater and surface water); Richard S.
Harnsberger, Nebraska Ground Water Problems, 42 NEB. L. REV. 721, 722-25
(1963) (discussing the hydrologic cycle); John D. Leshy & James Belanger,
Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 657,
660-66 (1988) (discussing the interaction between groundwater and surface
water).
8. An acre-inch is 27,154 gallons of water, enough to cover an acre of land one inch
deep. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-706(11) (Cum. Supp. 2004). An acre-foot is 325,851
gallons. See, e.g., HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 7.
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water may be discharged into a stream.9 This equilibrium condition
may be changed by groundwater development. When groundwater
withdrawals exceed recharge the balance is taken from the ground-
water stored in the aquifer, reducing aquifer discharge.
Groundwater and surface water are often are hydrologically inter-
related. Streamflow may recharge alluvial aquifers. These streams
are called losing streams, because they lose water to the aquifer. Sim-
ilarly, groundwater discharge forms the base flow of a stream, i.e., a
stream's flow when overland runoff is negligible. These streams are
called gaining streams because they gain water from the aquifer. In-
termittent streams, those that have little or no base flow, have
streamflow only after it has rained or snow has melted. Perennial
streams have significant base flow, and usually have streamflow most
if not all of the year.' 0
Groundwater and surface water have significantly different physi-
cal characteristics. One difference that is important in dealing with
interconnected surface water and groundwater supplies is the differ-
ences in surface water flow and tributary groundwater flow. In Ne-
braska, for example, streamflow may be twenty-five miles a day or
more, whereas groundwater flow may be 300 feet per year." This dif-
ference is significant in resolving water user conflicts. Closing a jun-
ior surface appropriator's headgate will usually increase the water
supply of a downstream senior appropriator, but stopping a junior ap-
propriator's well-pumping will not necessarily improve the supply to
the senior well in a timely fashion.12
The fundamental issue is that much of the groundwater pumping
in Nebraska (and in the West) involves the pumping of tributary
9. In some groundwater reservoirs, little or no discharge occurs. In these closed ba-
sins, the pressure increases as groundwater storage occurs. When wells are
drilled into these closed aquifers (artesian aquifers), the artesian pressure forces
the water to rise in the well. If the artesian pressure is great enough, the well
will be a flowing well. If enough groundwater is withdrawn from an artesian
basin, artesian pressure will decline ultimately to atmospheric pressure. Regard-
ing special legal rules applying to artesian groundwater basins, see generally 2
WELLS A. HUTCHINS ET AL., WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 653-59 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Misc. Publ'n No. 1206 1974).
10. NATURAL RES. COMM'N, STATE OF NEB., POLICY ISSUE STUDY ON INTEGRATED MAN-
AGEMENT OF SURFACE WATER AND GROUNDWATER 11 (1986). This report has a
Nebraska map identifying which streams are intermittent and which are peren-
nial. Id. at 13.
11. See Willis H. Ellis, Water Rights: What They Are and How They Are Created, 13
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 451, 470 (1967); Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, supra
note 2, at 183.
12. Douglas L. Grant, The Complexities of Managing Hydrologically Connected Sur-
face Water and Groundwater Under the Appropriation Doctrine, 22 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 63, 74-80 (1987).
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groundwater without regard to its future impact on streamflow.13
The long-term impact of this will be to turn gaining streams into los-
ing streams, and perennial streams into intermittent streams.14
C. Groundwater Law Fundamentals15
In the West, groundwater rights are either appropriative (usually
statutory) or based on the common law. The common law ground-
water theories are collectively referred to as overlying rights theories,
because they are all based on owning land overlying the groundwater
supply. The common law theories are absolute ownership, reasonable
use and correlative rights. Texas follows the absolute ownership rule,
where overlying owners have essentially no liability for any harm re-
sulting from their groundwater withdrawals.16 The American rule of
reasonable use, followed in Nebraska and for many years in Arizona,
establishes very limited liability for groundwater uses that are either
wasteful or are unrelated to the use of the overlying land.17 A major
feature of the California doctrine of correlative rights is that as the
groundwater supply is being depleted, courts will proportionally re-
duce all uses to the groundwater supply's safe yield.18 Where appro-
priation applies to both surface water and groundwater, any surface
water-groundwater conflicts will be resolved on the basis of priority.
Where groundwater rights are overlying rather than appropriative,
the legal categories of groundwater which are recognized will deter-
mine how surface water-groundwater conflicts are legally resolved. If
only subflow is recognized, then tributary groundwater withdrawals
are not integrated into the framework of surface water law. If the
tributary groundwater doctrine is recognized, judges and policy mak-
ers will have a better chance at achieving sustainable water manage-
ment outcomes.
13. NATURAL RES. COMM'N, supra note 10, at 65-66; Glennon & Maddock, Stream/
Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, § 22.03.
14. See Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, at 22-8 to -9,
-22.
15. This discussion is adapted from Aiken, supra note 7, at 936-40. See also WELLS
A. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST
146-55 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Misc. Publ'n No. 418 1942) (discussing the nature of
groundwater and underground streams); TARLOCK, supra note 5, ch. 4, 6
(discussing the law of groundwater allocation and appropriation); Harnsberger,
supra note 7, at 726-30, 735-36 (discussing different rules governing the use of
groundwater).
16. See TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:6.
17. See id. § 4:7.
18. See id. § 4:13.
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1. Legal Classifications of Groundwater'9
The major distinction between categories of groundwater is perco-
lating groundwater versus water in an underground stream. 20 Perco-
lating groundwater is defined as groundwater not in an underground
stream. An underground stream is a stream flowing underground
with a bed and banks, the channel of which is reasonably ascertaina-
ble from the surface without excavation. 2 1 Although underground
streams rarely occur in the physical world, they occur frequently in
legal decisions, probably because the concept can include the subflow
of the surface stream. The legal significance of the underground
stream doctrine is that surface water allocation rules apply to under-
ground streams. The underground stream doctrine is significant in
that where the doctrine includes subflow, surface water rights are ap-
propriative and groundwater rights are overlying. The effect of follow-
ing the underground stream doctrine is that groundwater-surface
water conflicts involving underground streams are resolved on the ba-
sis of priority, just as if appropriation applied to both groundwater as
well as to surface water. However, the categories of groundwater cov-
ered by the underground stream doctrine vary widely, in some cases
limiting its usefulness. Because most western states now apply prior
appropriation to both surface water and groundwater, the distinction
has lost much of its significance.2 2 However, the underground stream
doctrine is still followed in California 23 and Arizona, 24 where rights to
use water from an underground stream are correlated with surface
water rights.
For decades there has been widespread agreement within the legal
community that the legal concept of underground streams bears little
resemblance to hydrologic fact.25 Much of this criticism is based on
the notion that underground streams are subterranean limestone
caverns or underground tunnels, which admittedly are rare. Interest-
ingly, the first intimation of the underground stream doctrine dealt
not with underground caverns but with conventional surface streams
19. See HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 146-55; TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:35.
20. See HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 151-55; Harnsberger, supra note 7, at 731; Wells
A. Hutchins, Trends in the Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western States,
34 TEX. L. REV. 157, 157-60 (1955) [hereinafter Hutchins, Statutory Trends].
21. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 13-14.
22. See 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 631-33.
23. See id. at 690-96.
24. See Glennon & Maddock, Subflow, supra note 7, at 570-74; Leshy & Belanger,
supra note 7, at 666-704.
25. See, e.g., C.F. Tolman & Amy C. Stipp, Analysis of the Legal Concepts of Subflow
and Percolating Waters, 21 OR. L. REV. 113 (1942); Frank J. Trelease, Conjunc-
tive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853
(1982); Samuel C. Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground
Water, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 358 (1929).
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that flow, disappear for some distance, then reappear.26 This stream
disappearance phenomenon may be the result of drought or may be a
more or less permanent condition. But it is certainly a familiar cir-
cumstance in Nebraska, where portions of the Platte River routinely
go dry almost every summer, and certainly during a dry one. The
limestone cavern dimension is an American modification of the origi-
nal English expression of the concept.2 7 So, if the underground
stream doctrine stretches credulity, we have only ourselves to blame.
Furthermore, the underground stream doctrine was used by west-
ern courts to extend surface water law to the subflow of a stream.
Some western courts stretched the strict legal definitions of the under-
ground stream doctrine to include the subflow or underflow of a
stream. The underflow or subflow of a surface stream is the subsur-
face flow associated with a stream or river.28 The groundwater may
be leaving or entering the stream. In many western states, subflow is
considered to be part of the stream and subject to the same rights of
use. In those states, the subflow doctrine provides a basis for correlat-
ing surface water and groundwater rights in a common source, partic-
ularly if prior appropriation is not uniformly applied to surface water
and groundwater.
The underflow or subflow doctrine in turn was expanded by some
western courts to include tributary groundwater, groundwater which
otherwise will reach a stream if not first intercepted by a well.2 9 Trib-
utary groundwater is treated as being part of the surface stream and
is subject to the same rights of use. The tributary groundwater doc-
trine is the basis for interrelating surface water and groundwater
rights in a common water source in Colorado3o and in California.31
So, even though the underground stream doctrine may seem silly at
first blush, it has played an important legal role in allowing courts to
extend surface water law to interconnected groundwater, although, of
course, not in every case.
2. Overlying Rights Theories
Under the absolute ownership doctrine, a groundwater user may
withdraw groundwater without liability to other water users.3 2 This
implies that groundwater users would not be liable for interfering
26. See infra notes 56-57, 125-26, 169, 171-72 and accompanying text.
27. See text infra accompanying notes 76-83.
28. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 12-13; HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at
152.
29. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 158, 161, 165.
30. See William H. Hillhouse II, Integrating Ground and Surface Water Use in an
Appropriation State, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 691 (1975).
31. See 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 690-96.
32. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 155-56; TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:6.
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with surface water uses. However, because Texas has adopted the
subflow doctrine, the rights to use the subflow of a surface stream in
that state are subject to prior appropriation.3 3 Wells pumping sub-
flow will be treated as surface water diversions, but wells pumping
tributary groundwater are still outside the surface water law
system. 34
Under the reasonable use theory, groundwater withdrawals could
not be enjoined from interfering with surface water uses, unless the
groundwater use was wasteful or nonoverlying. 3 5 Because Arizona
has adopted the subflow doctrine, a limited but significant range of
surface water-groundwater conflicts-those involving subflow-will
be resolved on the basis of prior appropriation. So, wells pumping
subflow will be treated as surface water diversions, but wells pumping
tributary groundwater are outside the surface water law system.
36
Under the correlative rights doctrine, groundwater users share the
available supply when shortages occur. California courts have corre-
lated the rights to use surface water and groundwater from a common
source. How each conflict is resolved depends on the facts and circum-
stances of each case.3 7
3. Prior Appropriation
Where prior appropriation applies to both surface water and
groundwater law, the doctrine of priority is the basis for resolving sur-
face water-groundwater disputes and may be enforced through pri-
vate litigation or administrative proceedings. 38 Groundwater users
may be placed at a legal disadvantage if prior appropriation is applied
to interrelated groundwater and surface water. Since technological
developments in well design, pumps, and irrigation water distribution
systems have been relatively recent, groundwater users will typically
be junior appropriators relative to surface water users. Thus, the doc-
trine of priority means that junior groundwater development and use
will be restricted in order to protect senior surface water
appropriators.
The fundamental issue is whether tributary groundwater will be
integrated into the surface water appropriation system. Clearly, the
underground stream and subflow doctrines stop short of this objective
in states that do not apply appropriation to groundwater. But even in
states that do apply appropriation to percolating groundwater, or at
33. 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 742-44.
34. See Eric Behrens & Matthew G. Dore, Rights of Landowners to Percolating
Groundwater in Texas, 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 185 (1991).
35. TARLOCK, supra note 5, §§ 4:7-4:9.
36. See Glennon & Maddock, Subflow, supra note 7; Leshy & Belanger, supra note 7.
37. 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 690-96.
38. Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, § 22.03 [3]-[6].
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least to tributary groundwater, making groundwater appropriative is
in itself no guarantee that the coordination and integration of surface
water and groundwater rights is effective. 3 9
III. EARLY ENGLISH DECISIONS
A. Acton v. Blundell
The leading decision for the absolute ownership rule is Acton v.
Blundell.40 Many of the early groundwater decisions deal with con-
flicts between neighbors rather than specifically between neighboring
groundwater users. Acton is the first of many groundwater decisions
that involve mining operations that disrupt a neighbor's groundwater
supply. The defendant's 1837 coal mine intercepted the groundwater
that supplied the plaintiffs 1821 well, located three-quarters of a mile
away, with an 1838 mine tunnel, developed approximately one-half-
mile away.4 1 The court declined to apply riparian surface water prin-
ciples to the groundwater dispute, focusing upon the hidden character
of groundwater and how the damage caused by a new well could not be
ascertained until after the well was developed and began operation:
But in the case of a well sunk by a proprietor in his own land, the water which
feeds it from a neighbouring soil does not flow openly in the sight of the
neighbouring proprietor, but through the hidden veins of the earth beneath its
surface; no man can tell what changes these underground sources have under-
gone in the progress of time: it may well be, that it is only yesterday's date,
that they first took the course and direction which enabled them to supply the
well: again, no proprietor knows what portion of water is taken from beneath
his own soil: how much he gives ordinarily, or how much he transmitts [sic]
only, or how much he receives: on the contrary, until the well is sunk, and the
water collected by draining into it, there cannot properly be said, with refer-
ence to the well, to be any flow of water at all. 4 2
The court noted that allowing landowners to prevent changes in their
groundwater supply could significantly constrain important economic
development, such as "winning metals and minerals of inestimable
value."43 The court further noted that if a neighboring mine could be
the subject of a successful lawsuit to protect a prior well, "it is obvious
the law must equally apply if there is an interval of many miles,"44
leading to more litigation and additional economic development con-
straints. The court ruled that landowners owned the groundwater
39. Id.
40. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843).
41. Id. at 1232-34.
42. Id. at 1233.
43. Id. at 1234.
44. Id. Here the court is anticipating the tributary groundwater doctrine and the
"dangers" that it poses to groundwater users.
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contained in the soil, and that if its withdrawal and use harmed a
neighbor, it constituted harm without injury.4 5
The impact of the Acton rule has been significant. It is still the law
in Texas and in several eastern states, although its influence in the
eastern states may be waning.4 6 Acton's absolute ownership rule was
also the first rule of groundwater allocation in most western states.
47
Despite its economic development rationale, the rule has not stood the
test of time as a legal theory. The absence of responsibility, reciprocal
rights or balancing of interests makes the rule difficult to justify. Its
implementation leads to well interference conflicts, groundwater de-
pletion, and streamflow depletion. However, despite being replaced in
most western states by appropriation, the spirit of Acton thrives.
Most western groundwater pumpers, once they obtain their appropri-
ation permit, are unlikely to encounter any additional governmental
regulation or restriction of their pumping.48 In the states with the
most groundwater, California, Arizona, Nebraska, and Texas, 4 9 only
45. Id. at 1235.
46. TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:6.
47. The absolute ownership doctrine was adopted at one time in fifteen of the seven-
teen western states by court decision or statute. N.D. COMP. STAT. § 5341 (1913);
TERR. OKLA. STAT. § 4162 (1890); Howard v. Perrin, 76 P. 460 (Ariz. 1904), affd,
200 U.S. 71 (1906); Vineland Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigating Co., 58 P. 1057
(Cal. 1899); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Natatorium Co., 211 P. 533 (Idaho 1922); City
of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588 (1881); Ryan v. Quinlan, 124 P. 512 (Mont.
1912); Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363 (1872); Keeney v. Carillo, 2 N.M. 480
(1883); Taylor v. Welch, 6 Or. 198 (1876); Metcalf v. Nelson, 65 N.W. 911 (S.D.
1895); Houston & Texas Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904); Herri-
man Irrigation Co. v. Keel, 69 P. 719 (Utah 1902); Meyer v. Tacoma Light &
Water Co., 35 P. 601 (Wash. 1894); Hunt v. City of Laramie, 181 P. 137 (Wyo.
1919). Only Colorado and Nebraska did not at one time follow the absolute own-
ership doctrine. See 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 696-710, 736-37.
48. See Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, § 22.03 (dis-
cussing the legal status of tributary groundwater in all the western states except
Montana and South Dakota).
49. In 2000, ninety-one percent of the groundwater used for irrigation in the seven-
teen western states was withdrawn in eight states (MAF = million acre-feet):
California 13.1 MAF
Nebraska 8.3 MAF
Texas 7.3 MAF
Idaho 4.2 MAF
Kansas 3.8 MAF
Arizona 3.1 MAF
Colorado 2.4 MAF
New Mexico 1.4 MAF
Susan S. Hudson et al., Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 2000, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR No. 1268 21 (2004). See id. at vi for conversion
factors. Groundwater withdrawals in California, Nebraska and Texas totaled
28.7 MAF, sixty percent of the total 47.8 MAF withdrawn. See id.; see also Aiken,
supra note 7, at 923 n.16 (discussing comparable 1975 figures). Since 1975, Ne-
braska overtook Texas to move into second place for groundwater withdrawals for
irrigation. Texas withdrawals declined from 10 MAF to 8.3 MAF; Nebraska in-
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Arizona historically has imposed any meaningful developmental con-
trols on groundwater.50 California is nearly as wide open as Texas
with regard to groundwater development,51 while Nebraska has only
this year imposed well drilling bans in overdeveloped areas. 52 With
state groundwater regulations, there is often less than meets the eye.
B. Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co.
The next English groundwater case, Dickinson v. Grand Junction
Canal Co. ,53 fleshed out important dimensions of the absolute owner-
ship rule pertaining to the surface water-groundwater interrelation-
ship, and remarkably dealt with fairly refined aspects of that
interrelationship. The plaintiff paper mill owners sued the defendant
canal company for a steam engine-powered well depleting the flow of
the river powering the mills.5 4 The issues before the court included
(1) whether the defendant's "drawing off' streamflow was actionable,
and (2) whether the defendant's well-pumping was "diverting and
preventing from flowing into the river... a quantity of underground
water, which, in the natural and accustomed course of such water,....
would have flowed under ground into the river... ."55 Distinguishing
the two types of streamflow interference anticipates future western
groundwater disputes. In the first instance, the well is inducing aqui-
fer recharge from the stream; i.e., the well forces surface water to
leave the stream and flow towards the well. This induced recharge is
for all practical purposes synonymous with the subflow of the stream.
In the second instance, the well is intercepting what today is referred
to as tributary groundwater before it reaches the stream; i.e., the well
withdraws groundwater, which, if not withdrawn, would in time reach
the stream. While the Dickinson court does not use this modern ter-
minology, it does show surprising sophistication regarding ground-
water-streamflow interactions, especially given the Acton observation
creased from 5.9 MAF to 8.3 MAF. But Nebraska's total is likely to decline in the
future as groundwater irrigation is reduced in the Republican and Platte River
basins. See text infra notes 228-53.
50. See TARLOCK, supra note 5, §§ 6:21-6:30 (discussing Arizona groundwater deple-
tion controls); Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7,
§ 22.03 [21 [c] (discussing Arizona tributary groundwater law).
51. See Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, § 22.03 [2] [c]
(summarizing California tributary groundwater law); id. § 22.03[21[b] (summa-
rizing Texas tributary groundwater law).
52. See id. (summarizing Nebraska tributary groundwater law).
53. 155 Eng. Rep. 953 (Ex. 1852).
54. Id. at 953-56. Apparently the steam engine pump made the well a high-capacity
well for its day. In contrast, household wells were no more than holes dug into
the ground that filled up with water, with no pump. Obviously, such wells pene-
trating only the top of the aquifer would be vulnerable to any significant
drawdown, which a steam engine-powered well pump might be able to generate.
55. Id. at 957.
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that groundwater movement is secret and unknowable. Apparently,
either knowledge of groundwater had advanced significantly from
1843 to 1852, or the Acton court was incorrect.
Early in its opinion, the Dickinson court introduced a historic and
often misunderstood division of groundwater into categories of perco-
lating groundwater and groundwater flowing in a known, definite un-
derground stream. The court reiterated the rights of riparians to the
use of streamflow and applied the same doctrine in the instances
when surface streams disappear for awhile and then reappear at the
surface:
When water is on the surface, the right of the owner of the adjoining land to
the usufruct of that water is not a doubtful matter of fact; it is public and
notorious, and such a right ought as a matter of course to be respected by
every one: and indeed, if the course of a subterranean stream were well
known, as is the case with many, which sink under ground, pursue for a short
space a subterranean course, and then emerge again, it never could be con-
tended that the owner of the soil under which the stream flowed could not
maintain an action for the diversion of it, if it took place under such circum-
stances as would have enabled him to recover if the stream had been wholly
above ground.5 6
Although dicta, in this statement, the court has laid the foundation for
the early and often-criticized division of groundwater into two catego-
ries: percolating groundwater with no known course or channel, and
water in a known definite underground stream, with the same charac-
teristics (flow and banks) as a surface stream. Many critics deride
this categorization, contending that underground streams are rare,
and occur only in unusual circumstances, such as limestone caverns. 5 7
However, the definite underground stream that the Dickinson court
has in mind (and which we will hereinafter refer to as Dickinson
streams) is a circumstance quite common in the West-streams that
disappear (especially during droughts) and then reappear. This condi-
tion is certainly familiar in Nebraska and doubtless elsewhere in the
West. It seems to have been a circumstance that was not unusual in
England. So, even though future permutations of the underground
stream doctrine would strain credulity and well deserve the legal fic-
tion label, note that the original statement of the rule, applied to Dick-
inson surface streams that disappear and then reappear, is a very
sensible one.
The legal significance of the underground stream doctrine is the
Dickinson court's dictum that surface water law would apply to dis-
putes over such streams instead of Acton's absolute ownership rule of
non-liability. In addition, the underground stream doctrine would
provide a means for subsequent courts (and especially western courts)
56. Id. at 960-61.
57. See infra note 83.
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to extend the scope of surface water law to a wider range of intercon-
nected groundwater, ultimately to tributary groundwater.
In Dickinson, the court established liability to the groundwater
pumper for both inducing aquifer recharge from the stream, and also
for intercepting tributary groundwater.58 These exceptions to Acton
were intended to protect the riparian's right to the natural flow of the
stream. Four years later, in Broadbent v. Ramsbotham,59 liability for
groundwater pumping was limited only to inducing recharge from the
river, i.e., subflow; there was no liability for intercepting groundwater
that had not yet reached the stream, i.e., tributary groundwater, an
outcome more consistent with Acton. But the suggestion that tribu-
tary groundwater should be legally considered to be part of the stream
would return.
C. Chasemore v. Richards
In Chasemore v. Richards,60 the Broadbent reversal of the Dickin-
son liability for intercepting groundwater tributary to a stream be-
came definite. The defendant city captured percolating groundwater
and transported it to a nearby town in quantities so great as to reduce
the flow of the stream a quarter-mile from the well. The well pumped.
between 500,000 and 600,000 gallons per day, a significant amount.
The trial court found that the city well intercepted groundwater tribu-
tary to the stream, but did not induce recharge from the stream it-
self.61 On the basis'of Broadbent, an intermediate appeals court ruled
that the city was not liable for interfering with the streamflow. 6 2
The statement of the case is worth noting for the breadth of its
understanding of the tributary groundwater system:
The river Wandle is, and always has been, fed and supplied above the
Plaintiffs mill by (among other sources of supply) the water produced by the
rainfall on a district of many thousand acres in extent ....
Large quantities of this of this water sink into the upper ground to various
depths, and then flow and percolate through the strata towards and to the
river Wandle (if not interfered with), in some instances rising to the surface as
springs, and then flowing as little surface streams into the river; in other in-
stances finding their whole way underground into the river. The precise lines
and courses in which the underground runlets and particles of water so find
their way underground towards and to the river vary continually and infi-
nitely with the shiftings and variations in the soil which occur from natural
causes, but the general flow of large quantities of water to the river Wandle is
as above described; and if they are not interfered with or intercepted, they
58. 155 Eng. Rep. at 961-62.
59. 156 Eng. Rep. 971 (Ex. 1856).
60. 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (H.L. 1859).
61. The trial court also concluded that the city "had reasonable means of knowing the
probable and natural effects of their said acts and works." Id. at 142.
62. Id.
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form considerable sources of supply to the river, as well above as below the
Plaintiffs mill.
6 3
The statement of the case then delves into the effect of the pumping of
a high-capacity well on the tributary groundwater flow:
It is impossible to know beforehand the precise or complete effect which
the sinking of a new well, and pumping from it in any part of the district
above described, may have upon springs or streams in the vicinity; the effect
may be instantly sensible and considerable, or for a long time no sensible ef-
fect may appear; but the natural effect of abstracting a large quantity of water
at any spot of the district above described is to diminish the quantity at every
other spot throughout the district, though the amount of diminution at partic-
ular spots may be infinitesimally small; and the natural effect to be reasona-
bly expected from sinking a new well in such a district, and from continually
or almost continually pumping thence large quantities of water for a long
time, must be the sensible diminution of the water supply of springs and
streams in the vicinity.
6 4
For the supposed lack of understanding of groundwater occur-
rence and movement, the lawyers and judges of the day had a surpris-
ingly sophisticated grasp of the fundamental principles. 65
The six justices who heard the case gave five separate opinions.
The first judge argued that just as landowners are entitled to use dif-
fused surface water, they should similarly be allowed to use percolat-
ing groundwater. 6 6 The judge started a parade of horribles that would
result from making landowners liable for intercepting tributary
groundwater:
If the rain which has fallen may not be intercepted whilst it is merely perco-
lating through the soil, no man could safely collect the rain water as it fell into
a pond; nor would he have a right to intercept its fall, before it reached the
ground, by extensive roofing, from which it might be conveyed to tanks, to the
sensible diminution of water which had, before the erection of such impedi-
ments, reached the ground, and flowed to the Plaintiffs mill. In the present
case the Defendant's well is only a quarter of a mile from the river Wandle;
but the question would have been the same if the distance had been ten or
twenty or more miles distant, provided the effect had been to prevent under-
ground percolating water from finding its way into the river, and increasing
its quantity, to the detriment of Plaintiffs mill. Such a right as is claimed by
63. Id. at 141.
64. Id.
65. The attorney for the city argued that the large quantity of water should not be a
factor in the case, because the same effect could be created if each resident had
his or her own well. Id. at 145. Counsel suggested that the city's well was more
efficient and would have a smaller depletion effect than would be the case with
hundreds of individual wells. Id. at 145-46. This general argument anticipates
the nonoverlying use limitation of the American groundwater rule of reasonable
use. See text accompanying notes 100-109, infra. The city's attorney also asked,
if groundwater pumpers could not pump tributary groundwater, are surface
water users then to sue every upstream groundwater pumper in the watershed?
Id. This is virtually the identical circumstance as in the Spear T litigation dis-
cussed in section VI.E infra.
66. Id. at 147.
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the Plaintiff is so indefinite and unlimited that, unsupported as it is by any
weight of authority, we do not think that it can be well founded. ... 67
The fourth judge Lord Wensleydale provided a concurrence that is
essentially a dissent. He framed the issue as being a choice between
the broad Dickinson rule of extending the groundwater pumper's lia-
bility to intercepting tributary groundwater, and the narrower
Broadbent rule for limiting the pumper's liability to inducing
recharge.6 8 Lord Wensleydale then made an impassioned plea to
treat all tributary water the same, whether it flows in a definite chan-
nel or not:
If the River Wandle in this case had been supplied by natural streams
flowing into the river above ground, or in known definite channels below
ground, the cutting off those streams to which the person entitled to the use of
the river was entitled ex natura as feeders of the river, would be an injury to
him, and give a right of action. And if this be true with regard to underground
streams finding their way into the river, then comes the difficulty how to dis-
tinguish the smaller rivulets, and the drops of water which flow and percolate
into and supply the river. They are all equally the gifts of nature for the bene-
fit of the proprietors of the soil through and into which they flow. They are all
flowing water, the property in which is not vested in the owner of the soil, any
more than the property in the water of a river which flows through it on the
surface. 6 9
Lord Wensleydale then made what would today be considered a
reasonable use argument. After detailing why it would be foolish to
prevent all tributary groundwater uses simply because of their possi-
ble impact on streamflow, he proposed that overlying groundwater
uses be limited to reasonable uses, stating that the city's nonoverlying
use of water pumped from a large steam engine-powered well is an
unreasonable use.7 0 But despite his impressive arguments, the House
of Lords upheld Broadbent and disapproved the Dickinson rule of lia-
bility for intercepting tributary groundwater, affirming the lower
67. Id. at 149. The second justice argued that the distinction between percolating
groundwater and waters in a known definite underground stream was as sensible
as the well-defined drainage law distinction between diffused surface waters and
naturally flowing waters. Id. at 150-51. The third judge added that if the Dick-
inson rule of liability for intercepting tributary groundwater was imposed, "every
well that ever was sunk would have given rise, or might give rise, to an action."
Id. at 152.
68. Id. at 153. Lord Wensleydale participated in both cases, and contended that
Broadbent had been misread. Lord Wensleydale distinguished Broadbent from
Dickinson on the ground that the percolating groundwater at issue in Broadbent
wasn't really tributary-"In Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, it did not appear that
any water which percolated the strata would have reached the brook . . . ." Id.
Consequently, according to Lord Wensleydale, Broadbent should not be inter-
preted as overruling the Dickinson rule of making groundwater pumpers liable
for intercepting tributary groundwater before it reached the stream.
69. Id. at 154.
70. Id. at 155-56.
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court's ruling for the defendant. 7 1 In the tradition of other famous
dissents, Lord Wensleydale's arguments would ultimately prevail in
the adoption of the American rule of reasonable use, and in the mod-
ern tendency to dissolve the classification of groundwater as percolat-
ing and waters of underground streams in favor of treating all (or
virtually all) groundwater as tributary.
IV. SELECTED EARLY EASTERN STATE DECISIONS
A. Absolute Ownership Decisions
The earliest reported American decision dealing with groundwater
conflicts is the 1836 case of Greenleaf v. Francis.72 The plaintiff dug a
cistern in her basement, which involved putting a barrel into the
ground, essentially creating a well with no pump. Two years later, the
defendant installed his own well, also with no pump, on his own prop-
erty near the plaintiffs well. The plaintiff contended that the defen-
dant's well lowered the amount of water in her well. 7 3 The court
relied upon the common law maxim that in the absence of grant or
adverse possession, the landowner owns everything under the surface
of his land.74 Because there was no express grant and no adverse pos-
session, the court ruled in a brief opinion that the defendant was enti-
tled to maintain his own well, even though "it may have been
prejudicial to the plaintiff."75
The leading American absolute ownership case, Wheatley v.
Baugh,76 involved a mining operation interfering with a neighbor's
water supply. Here, the defendant miner pumped water out of its
mines in order to conduct its mining operations. The mine tunnel was
located over a quarter-mile from the plaintiffs spring. When the min-
ing pumps were operating, the plaintiffs spring would stop flowing in
approximately two weeks, and when the mining pumps were stopped,
the spring's flow returned in about two weeks. 77 The trial court found
for the plaintiff.78 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed.
The court began by acknowledging the common law rule that the
owner of land owns everything to the skies and to the depths.79 In
reviewing earlier water cases, the court acknowledged that percolat-
71. Id. at 156.
72. 35 Mass. 117 (1836).
73. Id. at 122.
74. Id. at 121-23.
75. Id. at 122-23. A similar result was reached in a case with virtually identical
facts in Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533 (1850).
76. 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
77. Id. at 528.
78. Id. at 530.
79. Id.
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ing groundwater was not subject to the riparian law of watercourses
but that underground streams were.8 0 In this regard, the court dis-
cussed limestone caverns as examples of such underground streams,
perhaps providing the genesis for the misapprehension of Dickinson's
reference to disappearing and reappearing streams. The court also
considered at length the resulting practical difficulties that resulted
when a landowner was prevented from any activity that might affect
the flow of percolating groundwater to his neighbor, significantly and
usefully extending the list in the Chasemore parade of horribles:
No man could dig a cellar, or a well, or build a house on his own land, because
these operations necessarily interrupt the filtrations through the earth. Nor
could he cut down the forest and clear his land for the purposes of husbandry,
because the evaporation which would be caused by exposing the soil to the sun
and air would inevitably diminish, to some extent, the supply of water which
would otherwise filter through it. He could not even turn a furrow for agricul-
tural purposes, because this would, partially, produce the same result. Even
if this right [to prevent a neighbor from changing the course of percolating
groundwater] were admitted to exist, the difficulty in ascertaining the fact of
its violation, as well as the extent of it, would be insurmountable. 8 1
The court also cited Roman law as authority for the absolute owner-
ship rule, to the effect that a landowner "may dig for water on his own
ground, and if he should thereby drain a well or spring in his neigh-
bour's ground, he would be liable to no action of damages on that
score."82 Based on these principles the supreme court ruled for the
defendant.83
B. American Rule of Reasonable Use
The next case, Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co.,84 is not a
groundwater case per se, but nonetheless is the leading case for the
American rule of groundwater reasonable use.8 5 Bassett is notewor-
thy in any event because of the court's startling decision to disregard
what it considered arbitrary classifications of water sources and to fo-
cus instead upon reasonable water use across water sources and any
80. Id. at 531.
81. Id. at 532.
82. Id. at 532.
83. Id. at 535-36. The limestone-cavern underground stream notion was also ex-
plored in another early case, which extended the absolute ownership doctrine to
percolating groundwater. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 300 (1861). The
case contains a good discussion of most of the extant groundwater decisions. The
court (as per Acton) rests its decision on (1) the "secret, occult and concealed"
nature of groundwater, and (2) the court's belief that any other rule would unduly
restrict economic progress. Id. at 311.
84. 43 N.H. 569 (1862). An earlier decision in the case dealt principally with whether
the plaintiff had satisfactorily proven that he possessed legal title to his land.
Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 28 N.H. 438 (1854).
85. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 159; TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:7 n.1.
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harm occasioned by such use.8 6 The plaintiff contended that the de-
fendant's dam across the Powow River flooded his meadow located
half a mile from the stream.8 7 An issue was whether a watercourse
had existed on the plaintiffs land, as the defendant's liability for flood-
ing depended upon whether the defendant raised the water level on
the plaintiffs land above the ordinary level in the river.8 8 If there was
no watercourse on the plaintiffs land, there was no ordinary water
level benchmark against which to measure the water level created by
the plaintiffs flooding. Frustrated by this legal rigidity, the court in
effect threw out the different categories of water sources, replacing the
rule of absolute ownership with a new groundwater allocation rule of
reasonable use.8 9
The law regulating water-courses has its origin or foundation in the benefits
and injuries that may arise from water; and among the former the propulsion
of machinery is but one of many. These benefits and injuries may often be
quite similar in cases of underground and surface drainage, and of drainage
by water-courses. In such inquiries the ultimate source of the water is never
regarded; and the immediate source seems to us equally immaterial, since it
in no way changes the nature or effect of the water; and the regulations now
settled by the law of water-courses were established, not because of any pecu-
liarity in the origin of water in streams, but because of the good or harm that
may result from its management or use .... 90
We think it does not follow, as some of the cases seem to assume, that
because a land-owner has not the absolute and unrestricted right of drainage
to or from his neighbor's land, he has no rights of drainage whatever, and that
each land-owner has the entire and unqualified ownership of all water found
in his soil, not gathered into natural water-courses, in the common accepta-
tion of that term.
There is another view entitled to consideration. If the rights are not abso-
lute and unqualified, they are qualified, or there are no rights at all. We need
not argue that some rights exist; that the owner of the land may make some
use of the water in it; that he may do some acts that will affect to some extent
the drainage; that a well may be dug, under some circumstances, although it
86. This approach would be most similar to the eastern rule of correlative rights and
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (1979). Regarding eastern correla-
tive rights, see Davis, supra note 7, at 203-04. Regarding the Restatement, see
TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:18.
87. Bassett, 43 N.H. at 569.
88. Id. at 569-72.
89. For example, the court was frustrated by the inconsistency of, on the one hand,
prohibiting riparians from diverting water directly from the stream under the
natural flow doctrine, but, on the other hand, allowing those same riparians to
legally and indirectly divert the same water from the stream through a well
under the absolute ownership doctrine. Id. at 576.
90. Id. at 576. The court continued:
Therefore, so far as a similarity of benefits and injuries exists, there
should be a similarity in the rules of law applied. Whether the deposi-
tion or detention of water in or its removal from land is caused by a
water-course, or by other means, can create ordinarily no difference in
the effects of such deposition, detention, or removal.
Id. at 576-77.
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will draw by percolation from a water-course, from adjoining land, or even
from the well of a neighbor. If the views we have expressed are correct, they
have already indicated the sole ground of the qualification of the land-owner's
right in such cases, and that is, as in certain cases of water-courses, the simi-
lar rights of others; and this will of course determine the extent of the qualifi-
cation, which . . . is the rule of reasonable use-of a reasonable exercise of
one's own right. The rights of each land-owner being similar, and his enjoy-
ment dependant [sic] upon the action of the other land-owners, these rights
must be valueless unless exercised with reference to each other, and are cor-
relative. The maxim, "Sic utere,". . . therefore applies, and, as in many other
cases, restricts each to a reasonable exercise of his own right, a reasonable use
of his own property, in view of the similar rights of others. 9 1
In other words, groundwater rights are reciprocal, and the benefit of
using A's well will be balanced against the harm to B's streamflow or
B's well. The court explicitly acknowledged that the new reasonable
use rule it was enunciating is in direct opposition to Acton's absolute
ownership rule, and that Acton is the leading case. However the court
noted that Acton had not been followed in New Hampshire, and
awarded the plaintiff a new trial. 92
The implications of Bassett are profound. For our purposes, Bas-
sett takes Lord Wensleydale's suggestion that the particular stage of
the hydrologic cycle that water is in should have no special legal bear-
ing on the outcome of a case. Bassett goes beyond Lord Wensleydale,
however, in suggesting that the rights of the parties are reciprocal or
correlative, and that all users need to reasonably experience some
level of inconvenience in order to accommodate the reasonable prop-
erty use of their neighbors. But when the interference becomes too
great, the injured party should receive redress. Groundwater users
may pump tributary groundwater (however classified), and surface
water users should experience some inconvenience to accommodate
the groundwater uses insofar as those uses are reasonable. But when
too much tributary groundwater has been withdrawn, the surface
water users must be able to obtain relief. The case-by-case implemen-
tation and lack of predictability are limitations of the reasonable use
approach, but it is vastly preferable to the head-in-the-sand, do-noth-
ing approach of absolute ownership.
The unreasonableness of nonoverlying or distant groundwater uses
was first enunciated in Smith v. City of Brooklyn.9 3 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the case also rejected the Broadbent prohibition of liability
for intercepting tributary groundwater. In Smith, the plaintiff was a
farmer who used a stream-fed and spring-fed pond for boat-building
and cutting ice. The defendant city developed a trench and a series of
wells to pump an average of over thirty-six million gallons per day
("mgd") in 1895, with the amount withdrawn increasing by six mgd
91. Id. at 577.
92. Id. at 579.
93. 46 N.Y.S. 141 (App. Div. 1897).
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every year thereafter. At trial, the plaintiff proved that the city's
trench was nearly seventeen feet lower than the bottom of the pond
and that water would percolate from the pond into the trench. The
stream and pond dried up shortly after construction of the city
wellfield began, and remained so once the wellfield went into opera-
tion.94 The defendant admitted that it pumped groundwater that was
tributary to the stream and pond, but asserted a right to do so under
the absolute ownership doctrine. The plaintiff appealed a judgment
for the defendant.
The appellate court distinguished the previous American tributary
groundwater cases following Broadbent in that none of the ground-
water uses intercepting tributary groundwater were nonoverlying
uses. 95 The court noted that the city purchased its land for its
wellfield intending to transport the water away from the overlying
land to the city:
The sole purpose was subordinate the use of the land to the particular purpose
of a reservoir and conduit in which to gather, store, and carry water to a dis-
tant place for its benefit and profit, and for the enjoyment of strangers who
have no claim or shadow of right to it as against the plaintiff. It was its pur-
pose not only to take the water which might come by natural percolation upon
its land, but also to use artificial means and by powerful suction drain the
adjoining land of its water. This purpose has been accomplished, and by the
construction of its conduit, the sinking of its wells, and the suction of its pow-
erful pumps, the whole spring level of the surrounding country has been low-
ered, and running streams and ponds dried up.
9 6
After briefly reviewing absolute ownership precedents, the court con-
cluded that the rule was justified by its benefit of allowing the land-
owner to make his land more valuable by using groundwater.
Referring to Bassett and the opinion of Lord Wensleydale in
Broadbent, the court elected to limit the overlying landowner's right to
freely pump groundwater to when the groundwater use benefitted the
overlying land.97
This right [to withdraw groundwater] is only qualified by the equal right of
every adjoining landowner. The right of use is supported in either when, for
purposes of use upon the land, or of the land, injury results to one as an inci-
dent to such use. But it seems to me monstrous to assert that one landowner
may deliberately and intentionally make an erection for the express purpose
of draining the land of another of its percolating water, and thereby destroy
streams, springs, ponds, and wells, and be supported in doing so upon the
theory that it is the exercise of a legal right in the use of his land. . . . "So use
your own property so as not to injure another," is a maxim as old as civilized
man and binding both in law and morals. It may be saved and applied to
94. Id. at 142-43.
95. Id. at 143-44. The court further acknowledged that Chasemore was the only
British exception. Id. at 148.
96. Id. at 143-44.
97. Id. at 145.
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percolating water and still support our prior decisions by placing the limita-
tions upon it which reason and justice suggest.9 8
The court awarded the plaintiff a new trial.99
Notably, there exists an important difference between Bassett and
Smith. The Bassett notion of reasonable use involves, inter alia, a
comparison of the respective uses, and would today be characterized
as the rule of Eastern correlative rights. Smith characterizes non-
overlying uses as per se unreasonable, which is the important distinc-
tion between the absolute ownership rule and the American rule of
reasonable groundwater use. Thus an overlying use that would be
reasonable under Smith could be judged to be unreasonable under
Bassett. It would be some time before the eastern states' correlative
rights doctrine would crystalize as a separate doctrine. Nonetheless,
it is noteworthy that American courts had begun diverging from the
absolute ownership doctrine.
The leading decision for the American rule of reasonable ground-
water use between competing groundwater users is Forbell v. City of
New York.100 In Forbell, the plaintiff grew celery and watercress on
subirrigated land.101 The defendant city purchased two acres of land
for its wells and pumps and withdrew between three and ten million
mgd, which it transported to New York City.102 The city's wells low-
ered the groundwater table over an area of between five and eleven
square miles, lowering the groundwater table under the plaintiffs
field by ten to fifteen feet.10 3 At trial, the New York Supreme Court
noted that the defendant city did not own the bulk of the land exper-
iencing the lowered groundwater levels, and that such water with-
drawal and transportation off-site was not a legal use (as per
Smith).104 The supreme court concluded that the city understood that
its well would draw groundwater from beyond its two-acre premises
but also from underneath the land of other landowners within the
region. 105
98. Id. at 145. The court also quoted the same language from Lord Wensleydale's
opinion in Broadbent as accompanies note 69 supra. Id. at 146. In addition, the
court noted the inconsistency the Bassett court identified in protecting a ripa-
rian's streamflow but allowing a groundwater pumper to dry up the stream. Id.
at 147.
99. Id. at 148. The subsequent verdict for the plaintiff was sustained on appeal.
Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 54 N.E. 787 (N.Y. 1899), affg Smith v. City of Brook-
lyn, 52 N.Y.S. 983 (App. Div. 1898). Neither case dealt more than superficially
with the Smith court's disapproval of Broadbent.
100. 58 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1900).
101. Id. at 645.
102. Forbell v. City of New York, 61 N.Y.S. 1005, 1006 (App. Div. 1900).
103. Id. at 1006.
104. Id. at 1007.
105. Id. at 1007-08.
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It created a condition whereby all the [groundiwater was drawn to one spot.
That this result would follow was, for all practical purposes, as well known
when the wells were driven as it was when the pumps were applied and the
conditions created. If the act is to be supported as the exercise of a legal right,
then we must be prepared to say that the defendant may turn the area which
it thus drains into a desert, and destroy, at least for agricultural purposes, a
large tract of land, without even the pretense of improving its own. 106
The New York Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the su-
preme court. The court noted that the defendant's plan was to pump a
large quantity of groundwater for nonoverlying municipal purposes:
The case is not one where, because the percolation and course of the subsur-
face waters are unobservable from the surface, they are unknown, and thus so
far speculative and conjectural as to be incapable of proof or judicial ascertain-
ment. Before the defendant constructed its wells and pumping stations it as-
certained, at least to a business certainty, that such was the percolation and
underground flow or situation of the water in its own and the plaintiffs land
that it could by these wells and appliances cause or compel the water in the
plaintiffs land to flow into its own wells, and thus could deprive the plaintiff
of his natural supply of underground water. This it has accomplished just as
it expected to do it; the evidence to that effect is about as satisfactory and
convincing as if the case were one of surface waters.
1 0 7
The court declined to follow the absolute ownership precedents, be-
cause the defendant understood the effect its pumping would have on
its neighbors, and because the defendant's nonoverlying use did not
benefit the land from where the groundwater was withdrawn.1 0 8
It is not unreasonable, so far as it is now apparent to us, that he should dig
wells and take therefrom all the water that he needs in order to the fullest
enjoyment and usefulness of his land as land, either for purposes of pleasure,
abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture, or for whatever else the
land as land may serve .... But to fit it up with wells and pumps of such
pervasive and potential reach that from their base the defendant can tap the
water stored in the plaintiffs land, and in all the region thereabout, and lead
it to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return, is, however
reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its customers, unreasonable as
to the plaintiff and the others whose lands are thus clandestinely sapped, and
their value impaired. 109
The court concluded that the city could legally acquire its water sup-
ply through eminent domain.
The American cases began moving away from the absolute owner-
ship doctrine. Salisbury is an amazing piece of natural resource juris-
prudence. Forbell initiated the overlying land restriction of the
American rule of reasonable use. While this restriction would not ulti-
mately protect streamflow from being depleted by tributary ground-
water withdrawals, it would avoid the inequity of a large well draining
local groundwater supplies to the detriment of other overlying owners.
106. Id. at 1008.
107. Forbell, 58 N.E. at 645.
108. Id. at 645-46.
109. Id. at 646.
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It would also complicate somewhat the water supply acquisition for
municipalities. 110
V. SELECTED WESTERN STATE TRIBUTARY
GROUNDWATER DECISIONS
The western decisions are too numerous to address individually.11
The cases discussed below are those most influential in the develop-
ment of western tributary groundwater law. Absolute ownership was
the principal rule for groundwater allocation in the West throughout
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.11 2 California
courts developed the correlative rights doctrine, while Nebraska and
Arizona followed the reasonable use doctrine and Texas adhered to
absolute ownership.113 Most western states, however, ultimately ap-
plied the appropriation doctrine to groundwater via statute.114 This
made resolving disputes over tributary groundwater simpler and com-
peting surface water and groundwater rights easier to correlate, as
priority of appropriation established the better right.
110. See TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:9.
111. Early cases are collected in Davis, supra note 7. Other general discussions in-
clude: Robert Glennon, Pinching Straws: Reforming Groundwater and Surface
Water Law to Protect the Environment, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7A-1 (2003);
Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7; Grant, supra
note 12; and Trelease, supra note 25. State-specific discussions include: David
R.E. Aladjem, California's Other "Dual System": Coordinated Management of
Groundwater and Surface Water, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7C-1 (2003); Behr-
ens & Dore, supra note 34; James N. Castleberry, Jr., A Proposal for Adoption of
a Legal Doctrine of Ground-Stream Water Interrelationship in Texas, 7 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 503 (1975-1976); F. Harlan Flint, Groundwater Law and Adminis-
tration: A New Mexico Viewpoint, 14 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 545 (1968); Glen-
non & Maddock, Subflow, supra note 7; David L. Harrison & Gustave Sandstrom,
Jr., The Groundwater-Surface Water Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legis-
lation, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1971-1972); Hillhouse, supra note 30; William E.
Holland, Conflicts between Private Appropriators of Stream Flows and Users of
Ground Water in Nebraska, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 592 (1977-1978); Ramsey L.
Kropf, Colorado Groundwater Law: Integration (Or Not?) of Groundwater and
Surface Water, 49 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7B-1 (2003); Leshy & Belanger,
supra note 7; Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Colorado's Law of"Underground Water":"
A Look at the South Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 579 (1988);
Stephen D. Mossman, 'Whiskey is for Drinkin' But Water is for Fightin' About": A
First-Hand Account of Nebraska's Integrated Management of Ground and Surface
Water Debate and the Passage of L.B. 108, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67 (1996); Sax,
supra note 3; Wiel, supra note 25; Jeffrie Minier, Note, Conjunctive Management
of Stream-Aquifer Water Rights; the Hubbard Decision, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J.
651 (1998).
112. See Hutchins, Statutory Trends, supra note 20, at 160-62.
113. Id. at 160-65.
114. See id. at 166-72 for a description of early statutes.
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A. Early Decisions
The first western case invoking the Dickinson prohibition against
inducing recharge from a stream was decided by the Kansas Supreme
Court in the 1881 decision of City of Emporia v. Soden.115 The defen-
dant city installed a large well above the stream supplying the plain-
tiff's mill pond. The well was located seventy-five to one hundred feet
from the river. The trial court found that the well induced recharge
from the mill pond. 116 The court opined that "a man may not do indi-
rectly what he may not do directly."'117 The court acknowledged that
absolute ownership was the common law rule for groundwater alloca-
tion, but held that the city could not induce recharge from the plain-
tiffs mill, citing Dickinson.118
In the 1881 Nevada decision of Strait v. Brown,119 tributary
groundwater was in effect treated as surface water, although the court
did not adopt the tributary groundwater doctrine. Duckwater Creek
was fed by discharge from Warm Springs, which flowed a short dis-
tance thorough a surface channel before being discharged into a large
wetland. The wetland had no natural surface outlet, but the jury
found that the waters from the wetland percolated underground about
one-half-mile to the creek. 120 The plaintiffs appropriated water from
Duckwater creek in 1867 for irrigation. In 1875, the defendants di-
verted water from Warm Springs for irrigation. The plaintiff alleged,
and the jury found, that the diversion from the springs cut off the
groundwater flow (in effect tributary groundwater flow) from the wet-
land to the creek. The jury concluded that there was no underground
stream connecting the creek with the spring, but also concluded that
the springs were tributary to the creek and the defendant's diversions
from the spring appreciably diminished the flow of the creek. The
trial court ruled for the defendants, based upon the jury finding that
there was no underground stream connecting the springs and the
creek.12'
On appeal, the defendants argued that since the defendants were
charged with cutting off the groundwater flow to the creek, the case
should be treated as a groundwater case. Under the absolute owner-
ship doctrine, this meant that the defendant was not liable for
preventing the groundwater from percolating to the stream. The Ne-
115. 25 Kan. 588 (1881).
116. Id. at 601. The opinion does not indicate how close the well was to the plaintiffs
mill pond, but the tracts were adjoining. Id.
117. Id. at 608.
118. Id. at 608-13. The opinion includes a thorough review of the English cases deal-
ing with induced recharge and intercepting tributary groundwater. Id. at
609-13.
119. 16 Nev. 317 (1881).
120. Id. at 319-20.
121. Id. at 320-21.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
vada Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the facts were clear that
spring fed the creek even if the groundwater percolating towards the
stream did not constitute an underground stream. The court noted
that surface water law applied to underground streams but not to per-
colating groundwater.12 2 The court also acknowledged that if the case
had involved the direct diversion of groundwater, the absolute owner-
ship doctrine would have governed and the defendants would have
won. However, the court ruled that the absolute ownership doctrine
was inapplicable, because the plaintiff did not seek to enjoin ground-
water diversions, but rather diversions of spring water (i.e., surface
water) that formed the source of the creek.12 3 The court concluded
that the mere fact that the water from the spring went underground
before it joined the creek should not be used to defeat the rights of the
senior appropriator:
It would be a mere pretense of protection of the rights acquired by the earlier
appropriators of the waters of the creek to say that later appropriators could
lawfully acquire rights to the springs which constitute the source of the creek
simply because the means by which the waters are conveyed from springs to
creek are subterranean and not well understood. 1 2 4
Although the court did not apply surface water law to tributary
groundwater explicitly, the result is the same as if it had. The court's
language regarding the injustice of allowing a junior groundwater
user to, in effect, steal a senior appropriator's water foreshadows the
eventual application of prior appropriation to tributary groundwater
in the West.
A California riparian-appropriator dispute involving, inter alia,
subflow rights was the subject of the 1908 case of Huffner v.
Sawday.125 The defendant appropriators sought to divert water from
the stream to work a mining claim. In ruling for the plaintiff ripari-
ans, the court acknowledged some fundamental arid hydrologic facts
that are also applicable to the Platte River in Nebraska.
It is true that there is evidence to the effect that during the summer months,
when the stream is dry in the San Pasqual [Valley, there is some water run-
ning at the defendants' [upstream] point of diversion. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the taking of this water would not injure the [riparian] respondents.
There are long stretches of sandy bottom between the defendants' proposed
works and the [riparian] lands of the plaintiffs. Water flowing over the rocky
bed above sinks into the sand, which must become saturated before there can
be a flow over its surface. To so fill this sand requires, as a witness testifies,
several weeks. The [trial] court was justified in drawing from this testimony
the inference that an interruption to the flow of this water would ... materi-
ally postpone the time when a surface flow would come to plaintiffs' lands.
122. Id. at 321.
123. Id. at 323-24.
124. Id. at 324. The case was followed in Cross v. Kitts, 10 P. 409 (Cal. 1886). The
extract was quoted with approval in Bruening v. Dorr, 47 P. 290, 293 (Colo. 1896),
and in Clark v. Ashley, 82 P. 588, 589 (Colo. 1905).
125. 94 P. 424 (Cal. 1908).
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Such postponement would be a clear injury to the plaintiffs, whose interest in
the waters of the stream included the right to have the river bed continue to
hold sufficient water to supply and support the surface stream in its natural
state.126
B. California and Correlative Rights
The California doctrine of correlative rights is one of the important
legal innovations in western groundwater law. California courts ulti-
mately expanded the underground stream doctrine to include tribu-
tary groundwater. In addition, the unique sharing feature of
correlative rights is an important and appropriate groundwater policy
for allocating scarce groundwater supplies among overlying owners.
Correlative rights doesn't do as well as far as equitably integrating
surface water uses with groundwater uses, although the physical solu-
tion provides at least part of the answer.
The 1899 California Supreme Court decision in City of Los Angeles
v. Pomeroy1 27 is an important milestone in the development of west-
ern tributary groundwater jurisprudence. Los Angeles sought to con-
demn property in the San Fernando Valley from which to divert
subflow from the Los Angeles river for municipal water supply pur-
poses.128 The parties understood that the entire San Fernando Valley
surface water and groundwater were a single integrated water supply
system.129 Under California water law, Los Angeles had pueblo water
rights giving the city "paramount" water rights to the Los Angeles
River.130 However, city attorneys feared that because of earlier Cali-
fornia absolute ownership decisions the city would have to compensate
the landowners for their percolating groundwater, even though the
city believed (correctly) that all or most of the percolating ground-
water was tributary to the river. Because of this, the city sought
broad jury instructions regarding what constituted an underground
stream, reasoning that if they could shoehorn their particular hydro-
logic situation into the underground stream framework, they could
achieve their objectives despite the absolute ownership rule. 13 1 Los
126. Id. at 427.
127. 57 P. 585 (Cal. 1899).
128. Id. at 586-87.
129. Id. at 591; Sax, supra note 3, at 276.
130. The portion of Pomeroy dealing with pueblo water rights is 57 P. at 599-604.
Regarding pueblo water rights generally, see WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFOR-
NIA LAw OF WATER RIGHTS 256-72 (1956) [hereinafter HUTCHINS, CALIFORNIA
WATER LAwI; 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 145-71.
131. This is a significant thesis of Sax and is fascinating legal history. See Sax, supra
note 3, at 275-86. The Pomeroy trial judge was Lucien Shaw, later chiefjustice of
the California Supreme Court, and author of the celebrated 1903 groundwater
decision in Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903), which establishes the Cali-
fornia doctrine of correlative rights in place of the absolute ownership theory.
Shaw later wrote that he gave the percolating groundwater-underground stream
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Angeles was successful in this regard and Pomeroy now stands for an
expanded definition of what constitutes an underground stream.
Pomeroy has been criticized for its convoluted underground stream
definition, with critics contending that a tributary groundwater defi-
nition would have made more hydrologic sense.13 2 But such an ap-
proach would have been a significant legal gamble, one the city
probably could not afford to take. The better approach is to recognize
Pomeroy as a significant decision in the historical development of the
tributary groundwater doctrine.
The first California Supreme Court decision establishing the Cali-
fornia doctrine of correlative rights, Katz v. Walkinshaw (Katz J),133
was issued in 1902. The plaintiff, who was using groundwater on his
overlying land, sued the defendant to enjoin her nonoverlying use.
The trial court dismissed the complaint.134 The defendants contended
on appeal that the absolute ownership doctrine applied. But Justice
Temple, writing for the court, demurred, stating that when an overly-
ing owner withdraws groundwater for sale to distant customers, the
water merchandiser also pumps groundwater out from underneath his
neighbors. 135
By pumping out the water from his lands, he can, perhaps, deprive his neigh-
bors of water for domestic uses, and in fact render their land valueless. In
short, the members of the community, in the case supposed, have a common
interest in the water. It is necessary for all, and it is an anomaly in the law if
one person can for his individual profit destroy the community, and render the
neighborhood uninhabitable. 1 3 6
After discussing Acton and noting the dramatic differences in climatic
and water supply conditions between California and England, the
court discussed a reasonable use concept similar to that expressed in
Bassett. The court noted with approval Lord Wensleydale's opinion in
Chasemore, in addition to Bassett's reasonable use theory and Smith's
instruction at Los Angeles's request, not because he approved of the distinction
(or the absolute ownership doctrine), but because Los Angeles needed the under-
ground stream doctrine at its disposal if the California Supreme Court adhered to
absolute ownership. See Sax, supra note 3, at 283 n.3 and accompanying text.
132. Sax, supra note 3, at 277-79. This is in part because California Water Code sec-
tion 1200 (enacted in 1913) made groundwater in an underground stream subject
to appropriation, but left percolating groundwater outside of the appropriation
system. The California Supreme Court did away with the legal distinction be-
tween percolating groundwater and the water of an underground stream by 1909,
but the 1913 legislation froze the distinction into statute. Sax, supra note 3, at
281-86, 286-317.
133. 70 P. 663 (Cal. 1902).
134. Id. at 664.
135. Id. at 664-65. The court's largely correct unarticulated assumption is that the
exporter will withdraw groundwater in sufficiently large quantities to cause
groundwater to be drawn towards his well from beneath adjoining tracts.
136. Id. at 665.
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conclusion that nonoverlying uses were per se unreasonable. 13 7 The
court noted the inconsistency of allowing a riparian the right under
absolute ownership to deplete streamflow with a large well but deny-
ing a riparian the right to divert the same amount of water directly
under the natural flow doctrine. 138 The court concluded that it has
never explicitly adopted absolute ownership, adopted the maxim sic
utere tuo (that a landowner should use his property so as not to harm
his neighbor), and awarded the plaintiff a new trial. 13 9 The court in
Katz I essentially adopted the American rule of reasonable ground-
water use as it was evolving in the eastern states, and rejected the
absolute ownership rule.
Because of the outcry from companies selling groundwater to mu-
nicipalities and others resulting from Katz I, the California Supreme
Court agreed to rehear the case. 140 Katz H was issued in 1903.141
Justice Shaw wrote a strong opinion supporting Katz I and responding
effectively to its criticisms. Katz H began by noting that a number of
groundwater merchandisers participated in the rehearing.14 2 After
dismissing the argument that common law rules should not be
changed by the courts, the court explored the geographic, climatic and
water supply conditions that justified a different rule than absolute
ownership. 14 3 In that regard, Justice Shaw described the potential for
future tributary groundwater depletion resulting from unconstrained
groundwater development and use that is particularly apt for
Nebraska:
It is usual to speak of the extraction of this water from the ground as a devel-
opment of a hitherto unused supply. But it is not yet demonstrated that the
process is not in fact, for the most part, an exhaustion of the underground
sources from which the surface streams and other supplies previously used
have been fed and supported. In some cases this has been proven by the
event. The danger of exhaustion in this way threatens surface streams as
well as underground percolations and reservoirs. Many water companies, an-
ticipating such an attack on their water supply, have felt compelled to
purchase, and have purchased, at great expense, the lands immediately sur-
rounding the stream or source of supply, in order to be able to protect and
secure the percolations from which the source was fed. Owing to the uncer-
tainty in the law, and the absence of legal protection, there has been no secur-
ity in titles to water rights. So great is the scarcity of water under the present
demands and conditions that one who is deprived of water which he has been
137. Id. at 665-67.
138. Id. at 667-68.
139. Id. at 668-69.
140. Sax, supra note 3, at 281-82.
141. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
142. Id. at 766.
143. Id. at 766-68. This includes an interesting description of the system of California
groundwater basins found in mountain valleys, which contains most of Califor-
nia's groundwater supplies. Id. at 768.
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using has usually no other source at hand from which he can obtain another
supply. 144
After discussing the importance of irrigation to California's economy,
and contrasting California's irrigation water requirements to the hu-
mid English climate, the court offered this sobering assessment:
It is clear also that the difficulties arising from the scarcity of water in this
country are by no means ended, but, on the contrary, are probably just begin-
ning. The application of the rule contended for by the defendants will tend to
aggravate these difficulties, rather than solve them. Traced to its true foun-
dation, the rule is simply this: That, owing to the difficulties the courts will
meet in securing persons from the infliction of great wrong and injustice by
the diversion of percolating water if any property right in such water is recog-
nized, the task must be abandoned as impossible, and those who have valua-
ble property acquired by and dependent on the use of such water must be left
to their own resources to secure protection for their property from the attacks
of their more powerful neighbors, and, failing in this, must suffer irretrievable
loss; that might is the only protection.
"The good old rule
Sufficeth them, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
The field is open for exploitation to every man who covets the possessions
of another, or the water which sustains or preserves them, and he is at liberty
to take that water if he has the means to do so, and no law will prevent or
interfere with him, or preserve his victim from the attack. The difficulties to
be encountered must be insurmountable to justify the adoption or continuance
of a rule which brings about such consequences.
1 4 5
The court concluded this portion of the decision by arguing that abso-
lute ownership in fact provides no protection to groundwater users,
while reasonable use provides more. The court then provided prospec-
tive guidance regarding how the new California groundwater doctrine
will be applied to future conflicts, giving the doctrine its unique correl-
ative rights dimension. The court indicated that nonoverlying users
will be subject to the needs of overlying users but will be able to appro-
priate any surplus for nonoverlying uses. 14 6 Competing overlying
owners "concerning water for use on the land, to which they have an
equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to be
settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion."14 7 Finally, the
remedy for nonusing overlying owners for nonoverlying uses should be
limited to damages. 148
Katz made the legal distinction between percolating groundwater
and the water of an underground stream legally irrelevant, in effect
adopting the tributary groundwater doctrine. Professor Sax has aptly
144. Id. at 768.
145. Id. at 769.
146. Id. at 771-72.
147. Id. at 772.
148. Id. at 772. The court referred to the new doctrine as "the rule of correlative
rights." Id.
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characterized the implications of Katz for tributary groundwater
disputes:
The relevance of the groundbreaking decision in Katz is that it made the doc-
trinal gymnastics of the Pomeroy case unnecessary, and reduced the subterra-
nean stream category to virtual irrelevance. If landowners pumping ground
water-even percolating ground water-must respect the rights of other
water-rights holders, whom their pumping injures, then it makes no differ-
ence in a case like Pomeroy whether the water in question was a subterranean
stream or percolating water....
Katz essentially determined the resolution of conflict between contending
water users should be based on the impact of one use upon another, rather than
upon some ex-ante classification of the source. This change was calculated to
bring the legal rules into congruence with hydrological realities; and in doing
so, to replace the legal fiction that groundwater movement was unknowable
with case-specific factual inquiries. Was the water's movement known or
practically determinable? If so, what were the impacts? And if there were
impacts, were they legally redressable? 1 4 9
These points are certainly as applicable in Nebraska today as they
were in California in 1903. Most western states would achieve this
same result by applying the doctrine of prior appropriation to both
groundwater and surface water, the exceptions being Arizona, Texas
and Nebraska.
The legal advantage of using wells over streamflow during a
drought was illustrated in the 1909 California Supreme Court deci-
sion of Hudson v. Dailey. 150 In Hudson the plaintiff riparian diverted
streamflow for irrigation and the upstream overlying owners obtained
their irrigation water supply from wells. During a drought, stream-
flow decreased and the water available for the plaintiffs use de-
creased too. The defendants continued using their wells, and the
plaintiff failed to prove that their use was unreasonable. So the
groundwater pumpers received their full irrigation water supply while
the surface water user received only a portion of her supply because of
the reduced streamflow.
The court addressed several important legal issues. First, the
court ruled that owners of land overlying a groundwater supply tribu-
tary to a stream have the same rights to reasonably use water on their
overlying land as a riparian proprietor would. 15 1 The measure of this
correlative right is reasonable use; reasonable use on the overlying
land (even if nonriparian) for the overlying owners and reasonable use
upon riparian land for riparian proprietors. If the supply is insuffi-
cient for all overlying owners, they are entitled to a reasonable share
of the available supply. But if the supply is sufficient for all overlying
owners, they are all entitled to full reasonable use upon overlying
149. Sax, supra note 3, at 282 (emphasis added). Note the close similarity to the rea-
sonable use doctrine espoused in Bassett.
150. 105 P. 748 (Cal. 1909).
151. Id. at 752.
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lands, regardless of the effect that these groundwater withdrawals
have on streamflow and riparian streamflow diversions. 15 2 Thus, dur-
ing a drought or other period of low streamflow, if groundwater with-
drawals are further depleting streamflows, the riparian's remedy is to
drill his own well. The riparian is not entitled to have the overlying
owners' groundwater withdrawals curtailed-the reasonable sharing
applies only among overlying owners making overlying uses. 15 3
There is some merit to this approach, at least in the short run.
Restricting groundwater withdrawals, particularly tributary ground-
water withdrawals, are unlikely to result in a timely increase in
streamflow to benefit riparian diverters. Restricting subflow with-
drawals might be a different story, but would create inequality among
overlying pumpers. Imposition of a physical solution might help allo-
cate the shortages among riparians and overlying pumpers. However,
the physical solution was not an element of California water law at
the time of Hudson. The physical solution doctrine involves an no-
noverlying or junior user directly providing substitute water to a ripa-
rian or overlying user in order to use the much larger quantity of
water to which the riparian or overlying user would otherwise be
entitled.
In City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District,'5 4 the dis-
trict's proposed impoundment would have reduced streamflows past
the city's wellfields. The state appropriation for the dam required the
district to not injure the city's water supply. Maintaining ground-
water levels would have required annual water releases of 120,000 to
360,000 acre-feet to allow the city to pump 3600 acre-feet from its
wells per year.155 The California Supreme Court ordered the trial
court to seek a physical solution that would allow the district to avoid
harm to the city's water supply more efficiently. 15 6 In the long run,
depleting tributary groundwater supplies would permanently deplete
streamflow. Although this issue has not been directly addressed by
California water law, the physical solution does suggest one approach
to dealing with it.
It was not until 1949 that the California Supreme Court finally
reached the logical conclusion of the correlative rights doctrine: how is
water allocated across uses when overuse creates a shortage? The
152. Id. at 753.
153. This is the simple case; in the future the mutual prescription doctrine would ap-
ply to competing overlying and nonoverlying pumpers creating a groundwater
overdraft. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949). See
generally HUTCHINS, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW, supra note 130, at 444-46.
154. 60 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1936).
155. Id. at 448.
156. Id. at 450. See Harrison C. Dunning, The "Physical Solution" in Western Water
Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 445, 462-63 (1986).
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court's answer in Pasadena v. Alhambral5 7 was the mutual prescrip-
tion doctrine. Several municipalities and other large pumpers were
depleting the Raymond groundwater basin. The California Depart-
ment of Water Resources, as referee, determined what the long-term
safe yield from the basin was, and most pumpers agreed to propor-
tional share of the safe-yield amount. The lawsuit was filed to force
the settlement upon the holdouts. The California Supreme Court ac-
cepted the settlement and the mutual prescription doctrine that was
its basis.158 Although mutual prescription, or the proportional shar-
ing of an aquifer's safe-yield amount, has not yet been applied across
surface water and groundwater users, a strong case can be made for
doing so, especially where the bulk of the streamflow is (or was) sup-
plied by tributary groundwater.
C. Arizona and Reasonable Use
The Arizona Supreme Court, in the 1931 Maricopa County deci-
sion,1 59 elected to limit its integration of surface water and ground-
water rights to subflow. The court distinguished correlative rights on
the basis that California had recognized the legal doctrine of riparian
rights and Arizona had not, despite the striking similarities in their
stream-aquifer conditions. 160 In a more recent decision, 16 1 and de-
spite considerable effort to persuade the court to expand the subflow
doctrine to include tributary groundwater, 162 the Arizon'a Supreme
Court adhered to the Maricopa County test. Consequently, tributary
groundwater pumpers can dry up a stream in Arizona just as they can
in most western states.
157. 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949).
158. TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:16. The mutual prescription doctrine was severely
limited by City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975).
The California Supreme Court ruled that prescription did not apply against mu-
nicipalities or holders of pueblo water rights. Id.; see also Charles E. Corker,
Inadequacy of the Present Law to Protect, Conserve and Develop Groundwater
Use, 25 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23-1, 23-7 to -11 (1979); TARLOCK, supra note 5,
§ 4:17.
159. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist. Number One v. Southwest Cot-
ton Co., 4 P.2d 369 (Ariz. 1931). See also Glennon & Maddock, Subflow, supra
note 7, at 571-74; Leshy & Belanger, supra note 7, at 676-90.
160. Maricopa County, 4 P.2d at 378-82. The court was also following a statutory
extension of appropriation to "water... flowing.., in [a] definite underground
channel[ I." Id. at 375.
161. In re General Adjudication of Gila River, 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993). The decision
is criticized in Glennon & Maddock, Subflow, supra note 7, at 570-74.
162. Leshy & Belanger, supra note 7, 743-44.
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D. Prior Appropriation 63
The first western case adopting the tributary groundwater doctrine
is the 1893 Colorado Court of Appeals decision, McClellan v. Hur-
dle.1 6 4 The case is remarkable in that it completely disregarded the
distinction between water in an underground stream, subflow, and
percolating groundwater (similar to Bassett) and simply characterized
groundwater tributary to a stream as being tributary groundwater (al-
though not using that precise term). The plaintiff was a senior appro-
priator from Lone Tree Creek with an 1886 priority.165 The
defendants in 1889 sank a well near the bank of the creek, and the
well-pumping allegedly reduced the flow of the creek. The trial court
instructed the jury to follow the absolute ownership rule: "As a matter
of law, that water that percolates through the soil, without an evident
and well-known channel, is regarded as a part of the land, and belongs
to the water owner thereof.... "16 6 The trial court also gave the jury a
subflow instruction "that digging wells close to a stream, so that the
waters of the stream necessarily percolate into such wells, thus dimin-
ishing the water previously appropriated, is but doing indirectly what
the law forbids being done directly, and will not be allowed."16 7
Clearly, the case was argued at a sophisticated level (or at least an
imaginative one) regarding groundwater legal doctrine. Despite the
subflow instruction, the jury nonetheless found for the defendants,
concluding that the defendants' well-pumping did not diminish the
flow of the creek.
The court of appeals, after reciting the absolute ownership instruc-
tion, continued:
It is probably safe to say that it is a matter of no moment whether water
reaches a certain point by percolation through the soil, by a subterranean
channel, or by an obvious surface channel. If by any of these natural methods
it reaches the point, and is there appropriated in accordance with law, the
appropriator has a property in it which cannot be divested by the wrongful
diversion by another, nor can there be any substantial diminution. To hold
otherwise would be to concede to superior [i.e., upstream or headwater] own-
ers of land the right to all sources of supply that go to create a stream, regard-
less of the rights of those who previously acquired the right to the use of the
water from the stream below. 1 6 8
The court ruled that the absolute ownership instruction was harmless
in view of the jury finding that the defendants' well-pumping did not
harm the plaintiff. The court of appeals did approve the subflow in-
163. Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, § 22.03
(providing a useful review of the tributary groundwater policies in most western
states).
164. 33 P. 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 1893).
165. Id. at 280.
166. Id. at 281.
167. Id. at 281.
168. Id. at 282.
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struction as a clear statement of "all the law of the case." The court
then described a Dickinson stream:
Streams of the character described in the complaint are frequent through-
out the entire arid portion of the continent, and their existence and peculiari-
ties cannot be ignored, being well-defined surface streams with well-defined
channels, for long distances then, for miles, sunken, until uniting with an-
other stream, but having, topographically, all the physical characteristics of a
stream,-a bed, banks, valley, etc., at times of high water, being, its entire
length, a running surface stream, and, in low water, or droughts, running
short distances, standing in pools, sinking into gravel or loose material in its
bed, percolating through or passing under it, and reappearing at some point
below, but still delivering at different points a greater or less volume of water,
-sometimes at the surface, sometimes much below. It is not necessary to
legally define water courses having these peculiar characteristics. They are,
as conduits of water, such source of supply as to furnish an appropriator a
legal basis for the appropriation of the available water. In the case of a run-
ning surface stream the question of appropriation is of easy solution; but not
so in a sunken stream, particularly at a point where the water is an indefinite
distance below the surface. 1
6 9
The court's description of what would later be referred to as tributary
groundwater completely disregarded the legal categories of ground-
water as percolating, underflow or underground stream, anticipating
the widespread criticism of those artificial categories. The description
of Dickinson sunken streams pointed to a circumstance that would
confound many western courts regarding whether the groundwater of
such sunken streams should be considered part of a definite under-
ground stream, or whether the groundwater should constitute the
subflow or underflow of a surface stream. 170 But the court admirably
swept these complications aside in treating the groundwater as tribu-
tary to a surface stream, or tributary groundwater. In time, the con-
cept of tributary groundwater would become the foundation for
Colorado groundwater law. While the court cited no legal precedents,
it certainly created an important one.
In the 1902 decision of Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams, 17 1 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court dealt with a buried stream channel, a fairly com-
mon phenomenon in the West. Buried streams are streams that were
present in prehistoric times and were then covered by other geologic
materials when the glaciers advanced and then retreated. The buried
stream channel in this case was probably of more recent origin, having
been covered by sand dunes. In Medano, the issue was whether two
creeks were connected by a buried stream and whether the buried
stream was an underground watercourse. The defendant had appro-
priated water from the upper branch, and would be junior to the plain-
tiff on the lower branch if the upper and lower branches were
169. Id. at 282.
170. Id. The court is also critical of the plaintiffs factual case, implying that if the
plaintiff had done a better job at trial, the plaintiff would have won. Id.
171. 68 P. 431 (Colo. 1902).
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connected by the buried river channel. After considerable discussion
of the evidence, the court ruled that the buried river channel did exist,
that it was a watercourse and not percolating groundwater, and that
the defendant was subject to the plaintiffs senior priority.172
In the 1905 decision in La Jara Creamery & Livestock Ass'n v.
Hansen17 3 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that subsurface irriga-
tion return flows percolating to the stream were tributary to the
stream and subject to the rights of senior appropriators. The court
noted the existence of Dickinson streams in Colorado, stating: "It is a
well-known fact that some streams in this state, after running for less
or greater distances on the surface, sink, and by a well-defined subter-
ranean channel flow for a number of miles, and then come to the sur-
face again."17 4
A 1938 Utah Supreme Court decision recognizing the tributary
groundwater doctrine gives perhaps the best judicial description of
how tributary groundwater feeds streamflow, one that applies to Ne-
braska as well as to Utah:
Rains and snows falling on this entire vast area sink into the soil and find
their way by surface or underground flow or percolation through the sloping
strata down to the central channel. This entire sheet of water, or water table,
constitutes the river and it never ceases to be such in its centripetal motion
towards the channel. Any appropriator of water from the central channel is
entitled to rely and depend upon all the sources which feed the main stream
above his own diversion point, clear back to the farthest limits of the
watershed. 1 7 5
Colorado law goes the farthest of any appropriation state in recog-
nizing that the doctrine of priority may be inequitable if rigidly ap-
plied to surface water-groundwater conflicts.17 6  In Colorado,
tributary groundwater is regulated as part of the surface water sup-
ply. Colorado law has adopted several features to accommodate junior
groundwater users. Surface water users are permitted to transfer
their priority date to a well, in effect substituting a more reliable
groundwater supply for a less dependable surface water supply and
still retaining their earlier priority date.17 7 In addition, junior
groundwater users are permitted to provide substitute water to senior
surface water users to compensate for stream depletion by ground-
water withdrawals. Finally, junior groundwater users are not re-
quired to stop withdrawing groundwater that depletes streamflow if
172. Id. at 433-34. The Colorado Supreme Court took a narrower approach to ground-
water than did the Colorado Court of Appeals in McClellan.
173. 83 P. 644, 645 (Colo. 1905).
174. Id. at 645.
175. Richlands Irrigation Co. v. Westview Irrigation Co., 80 P.2d 458, 465 (Utah
1938).
176. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 111; Hillhouse, supra note 30; MacDonnell,
supra note 111.
177. Hillhouse, supra note 30, at 707-09.
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the increase in streamflow will not occur soon enough to benefit the
senior surface water appropriator.' 78 But the junior tributary well
should be required to provide the substitute water to the senior sur-
face appropriator; otherwise, in the long run, the stream depletions
would increase.1 79
New Mexico has developed an interesting strategy for dealing with
the stream depletion effects of tributary wells. The first case is the
famous Templeton decision.i 8 0 The plaintiff sought to obtain a permit
to drill an irrigation well into a basin that had been closed to further
wells and transfer his surface appropriation priority date to the well,
in effect changing his point of diversion from the stream to the well.
The well would be withdrawing tributary groundwater, the with-
drawal of which had reduced streamflows. One witness testified that
tributary wells first intercepted tributary groundwater, lowering the
water table and reducing streamflows. Ultimately the wells began in-
ducing recharge. The stream had been transformed from a gaining
stream into a losing stream, and the plaintiff elected to switch to
groundwater instead of attempting to secure priority administration
of the tributary wells (the result of which would have been uncertain
at best). The State Engineer denied the well application, but was re-
versed by the district court. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed
the district court and allowed the change in the point of diversion.181
The next case demonstrates the utility of allowing uses to shift be-
tween surface water rights and groundwater rights. In City of Albu-
querque v. Reynolds, i 8 2 the city sought to appropriate tributary
groundwater. State Engineer studies indicated that, over seventy-five
years, half the water withdrawn would come from the river.' 8 3 The
State Engineer required the city to purchase and retire sufficient sur-
face appropriations to compensate for the stream depletion effect of its
wells. If this type of system could be imposed prospectively before an
overwhelming number of tributary wells are installed, this system
would limit the development of tributary wells (because it would in-
crease their cost), and would significantly protect surface water users
from the depletion effects of the tributary wells.18 4 To impose such a
178. Id. at 706-07.
179. See Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, § 22.03 [3].
180. Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 332 P.2d 465 (N.M. 1958).
Regarding Templeton, see TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 6:20; Ellis, supra note 11, at
474-75; and Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7,
§ 22.03[6] (providing a critical viewpoint).
181. Templeton, 332 P.2d at 469-70.
182. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (N.M. 1962).
183. Id. at 78. It is not clear whether this amount would have included induced
recharge, and/or the interception of tributary groundwater flow to the river, but it
probably included both.
184. Id. The degree of protection afforded, however, would depend upon the seniority
of the retired appropriations. If they were relatively junior and did not represent
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system after significant tributary well development has occurred and
significant tributary groundwater depletions are making their way to
the stream, the cost of bringing the surface and tributary groundwater
system into balance might be too high-the replacement costs for jun-
ior tributary well owners, for example, might be gallon-per-gallon. Ir-
rigators are not dependably deep-pocket defendants, so following the
Templeton approach might in effect require irrigators to abandon their
tributary wells rather than to compensate the stream for their deple-
tion effect. Nonetheless, Templeton and Albuquerque v. Reynolds il-
lustrate how the forced retirement of surface appropriations by junior
tributary groundwater appropriators may be one way to balance com-
peting surface water and groundwater rights. However, as Professor
Glennon points out, allowing tributary groundwater appropriators to
buy their way out of their stream depletion effect could dry up the
stream (or turn a gaining stream into a losing stream, as per Temple-
ton) if tributary groundwater withdrawals are not limited.185 To pro-
tect streamflows, as opposed to simply protecting senior surface
appropriations, stream depletions caused by tributary wells must be
reduced.
E. Texas and Absolute Ownership
Texas is the only western state that still follows absolute owner-
ship. The absolute ownership rule was adopted by the Texas Supreme
Court in the 1904 decision of Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. v.
East.i8 6 The defendant railroad installed a well with a steam engine-
powered pump and dried up the plaintiffs shallower domestic well.
The trial court held for the defendant and the court of appeals re-
versed. The supreme court reversed again, citing two reasons for its
opinion:
(1) Because the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters, and
the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult and
concealed that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to
them would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would therefore be prac-
tically impossible. (2) Because any such recognition of correlative rights
would interfere, to the material detriment of the commonwealth, with drain-
age of agriculture, mining, the construction of highways and railroads, with
sanitary regulations, building, and the general progress of improvement in
works of embellishment and utility.1 8 7
a stable water supply, they would be cheaper to purchase; however, appropriators
senior to the retired appropriations would experience some interference. If the
rights purchased were senior, then no remaining surface appropriators would be
harmed, but the cost of the retired appropriations would be higher.
185. Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interactions, supra note 7, at 22-39.
186. 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904), rev'g East v. Houston & Texas Cent. R.R. Co., 77 S.W.
646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
187. 81 S.W. at 281 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861)).
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The court acknowledged the reasonable use precedents of Bassett,
Smith, and Forbell, but was not persuaded by them.18 8 Texas courts
have applied surface water law to subflow, however.18 9 The absolute
ownership doctrine was recently affirmed and the tributary ground-
water doctrine again rejected in Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co. 190 Inter-
estingly, Texas has administratively designated the Edwards Aquifer
as an underground stream to deal with endangered species issues not
unlike those facing Nebraska on the Platte.'19
F. Conclusions
While judicial or statutory recognition of the tributary ground-
water doctrine is necessary, it is only the first step. Mere recognition
of the doctrine without sufficient accompanying management policies
to limit tributary groundwater development or to curtail tributary
groundwater use will not protect streamflows or the water rights they
support. However, without recognizing the tributary groundwater
doctrine and making those pumping tributary groundwater subject to
regulation, tributary groundwater-pumping will continue to deplete
the base flow of streams, turning gaining streams into losing streams
and perennial streams into intermittent streams. Raising the cost of
tributary groundwater development by requiring the purchase and re-
tirement of the quantity of streamflow depletion that the tributary
well generates should slow streamflow depletion. But reducing tribu-
tary well-pumping would ultimately be needed to maintain
streamflows.
VI. THE EMERGING NEBRASKA LAW OF
TRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER
Relatively abundant groundwater supplies available in the state
have made Nebraskans complacent regarding tributary groundwater
issues. However, external events, including Platte River federal en-
dangered species requirements and Republican River Basin Compact
litigation, are forcing Nebraska water policy makers to acknowledge
and begin dealing with tributary groundwater. Recent legislation will
allow the State to implement policies to minimally protect streamflow
by reducing tributary well-pumping. The pending Spear T Ranch liti-
gation192 between competing surface water and groundwater irriga-
tors in Pumpkin Creek in the North Platte River basin will also force
188. 81 S.W. at 281-82.
189. 2 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 742-44.
190. 771 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App. 1989). See also Behrens & Dore, supra note 34 (ana-
lyzing the case).
191. See TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 4:35 nn.12-20 and accompanying text.
192. See notes 252-59 infra and accompanying text; see also Brief for Appellant at 1-2,
Spear T Ranch v. Knaub (No. A-03-000789).
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the Nebraska Supreme Court to reconsider its 1966 Metropolitan Util-
ities District (MUD) decision193 that hydrologically interrelated sur-
face water and groundwater supplies need not be legally interrelated.
A. Reasonable Use
In its first major groundwater decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court in the 1933 decision of Olson v. City of Wahoo194 adopted the
American rule of reasonable use. The major significance of this case is
that the court did not adopt the absolute ownership rule along with its
rejection of the tributary groundwater doctrine. The court did recog-
nize that the Todd Valley groundwater supply was hydrologically con-
nected to the Platte River.195
The Olson court's correlative rights dicta has perhaps been influen-
tial in the development of a correlative rights tilt within Nebraska's
groundwater management statutes. Priority is not a factor in the Ne-
braska Groundwater Management and Protection Act. Instead, all
groundwater irrigators are given an equal groundwater allocation to
use, regardless of their well's priority.19 6 Natural Resources Districts
(NRDs) may, under subsections 46-739(4) and (5) of the Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes, vary groundwater allocations for a limited number of
specified reasons, including different irrigation equipment. Priority is
introduced as a possible regulatory factor by subsection 46-739(6)(b)
only when NRDs are dealing with surface water-groundwater dis-
putes, in that NRDs can differ groundwater regulations relating to
hydrologically-connected groundwater, based on a cut-off date estab-
lished by the NRD. But, even here, section 46-739(6)(b) does not es-
tablish a well's individual priority date as a basis for regulation;
instead the statute basically allows NRDs to exempt existing wells
from regulations dealing with hydrologically-connected groundwater,
and to apply those regulations only prospectively to new wells. There-
fore, section 46-739(6)(b) does not establish priority in the traditional
sense of prior appropriation, but rather gives NRDs the authority to
make certain regulations prospective only instead of applying to, for
example, all groundwater wells, existing and future alike. For these
193. Metro. Util. Dist. of Omaha v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626
(1966).
194. 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933). See HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5,
at 214-17; Harnsberger, supra note 7, at 730.
195. Olson, 124 Neb. at 812-13, 248 N.W. at 308.
196. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-739(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2004). See also J. David Aiken
& Raymond J. Supalla, Ground Water Mining and Western Water Rights Law:
The Nebraska Experience, 24 S.D. L. REV. 607, 635-42 (1979) (groundwater allo-
cated on basis of irrigated acres, not on the basis of prior appropriation); Aiken,
supra note 7, at 963-65 (Upper Republican NRD groundwater allocations based
on irrigated acres, not on appropriation).
[Vol. 83:541
2004] COMMON LAW OF TRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER 581
reasons, the Olson correlative rights dicta has had an important im-
pact on the evolution of Nebraska groundwater management statutes.
B. Rejection of the Subflow Doctrine? The MUD Decision
By implication, the American rule of reasonable use includes the
subflow doctrine. 19 7 Even Texas, with its absolute ownership doc-
trine, follows the subflow doctrine. 198 However, in a complicated set-
ting, the Nebraska Supreme Court by implication rejected the subflow
doctrine in its 1966 Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) decision. 19 9
The first precedent for this case is the 1936 Osterman decision 20 0 ban-
ning transbasin diversions of surface water. This controversial deci-
sion was still a major factor in Nebraska water law and politics when
Omaha, in the 1960s, attempted to secure legislation to allow it to
pump Platte River subflow to Omaha. 20 1 A statute that failed to in-
corporate underground stream, percolating groundwater, subflow, or
tributary groundwater language was adopted, and Omaha applied for
a municipal groundwater transfer permit under the Act.2 0 2 The
Omaha Metropolitan Utilities District ("MUD") applied under section
46-638 for a permit for its proposed Plattsmouth wellfield. MUD pro-
posed to construct thirty-seven wells on a 600-acre site approximately
five miles upstream of the confluence of the Platte and Missouri Riv-
ers. MUD proposed to withdraw an average of forty mgd with a maxi-
mum of sixty mgd (approximately ninety-three cubic feet per second
("cfs")). 20 3 The Nebraska Department of Water Resources ("DWR")204
director found that at least eighty percent of the groundwater with-
drawn was induced recharge from the Platte, and the wellfield's
pumping would lower streamflow by approximately 1.2 inches during
197. Regarding Arizona subflow law, see 3 HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 9, at 171-72.
198. Regarding Texas subflow law, see id. at 742-44.
199. Metro. Util. Dist. of Omaha v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626
(1966).
200. Osterman v. Cent. Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268
N.W. 334 (1936), overruled by Little Blue Natural Res. Dist. v. Lower Platte N.
Natural Res. Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980). One major impact of
Osterman was to protect, at least temporarily, streamflows in the Platte by
preventing additional appropriations for out-of-basin use. J. David Aiken, New
Directions in Nebraska Water Policy, 66 NEB. L. REV. 8, 19-20 (1987). For
a sharp criticism of the decision and an interesting account of its political after-
math, see Jarrett C. Oeltjen, Richard S. Harnsberger & Ralph J. Fischer, In-
terbasin Transfers: Nebraska Law and Legend, 51 NEB. L. REV. 87 (1971).
201. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 218-20; Aiken, supra note 7, at
951-55; Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 2, at 210-25.
202. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-638 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
203. Cubic feet per second ("cfs") is a measure of water flow. One cfs equals 448.8 gpm
(gallons per minute). HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 7-8.
204. The DWR became the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) on
March 22, 2000. L.B. 900, 96th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2000 Neb. Laws 5 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of chapters 2 and 46 of NEB. REV. STAT.).
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the lowest recorded discharge (240 cfs on September 3, 1955) and con-
siderably less during periods of normal flow. The director also deter-
mined that the water withdrawn by MUD was groundwater as per
section 46-635, and expressly made no determination regarding
whether the proposed diversion was illegal under Osterman.205 Oppo-
nents contended that the groundwater was subflow, and Omaha
would be illegally moving groundwater from the Platte basin to the
Papio basin in violation of Osterman.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the DWR grant of the
MUD permit. After describing the proposed MUD wellfield the court
set forth the provisions of the Act.206 Significantly, the court did not
pursue the issue of whether the water to be withdrawn by MUD le-
gally constituted surface water or groundwater, merely stating: "All of
the water will be pumped from the ground, a direct diversion of water
from the river not being contemplated."20 7 The court discussed
whether objectors' allegations of unconstitutionality could be initially
raised on appeal, concluding that they could.208 However, given the
court's conclusion that MUD's proposed withdrawals would not inter-
fere with objectors' groundwater levels or lake levels, objectors lacked
standing to raise the issue of unconstitutionality. 20 9
The court finally reached the issue of transbasin diversion, consid-
ering "the right of [MUD] to take water from the Platte River water-
shed outside of that watershed for its municipal purposes[:] . . . We
think, because of the magnitude and importance of the question, and
the interest of the objectors as resident riparian landowners within
the Platte River watershed, that this question must be deter-
mined."2 10 The court then reviewed the history of the development of
riparian and appropriative rights in Nebraska and the different
course taken with regard to groundwater management. 2 11 After
describing the piecemeal enactment of groundwater legislation, the
court stated:
It will be observed that acts of the Legislature were the mere beginnings in
the exercise of possible control and regulation of ground water. While the
rights of appropriators to the use of water from rivers and streams have been
protected over the years, rights in the use of ground water have not been de-
205. Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 2, at 222.
206. Metro. Util. Dist., 179 Neb. at 785-91, 140 N.W.2d at 629-32.
207. Id. at 787, 140 N.W.2d at 630.
208. Id. at 790-92, 140 N.W.2d at 632-33.
209. Id. at 792-96, 140 N.W.2d at 633-35. The court suggested that while objectors'
contention that the Act lacked appropriate administrative standards had great
merit, objectors could still proceed against MUD for damages under the Act if
they could ultimately prove damage; therefore their lack of standing did not com-
promise their rights. Id. at 796, 140 N.W.2d at 635.
210. Id. at 796-97, 140 N.W.2d at 635 (emphasis added). Note that the court refers to
water, not groundwater.
211. Id. at 797-99, 140 N.W.2d at 635-36.
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termined nor protected, nor the public policy with reference to the use of such
underground waters legislatively declared. The difficulties in administering
dual conflicting principles, and fixing the rights of users thereunder, are read-
ily apparent.
2 1 2
In this statement, the court acknowledged the difficulty inherent in
attempting to coordinate appropriative (and riparian) rights to use
surface water with common law rights to use groundwater. The court
then stated that the constitutional declaration that the use of water
for domestic and irrigation purposes is a natural want applied both to
surface water and groundwaters. "Underground waters, whether they
be percolating waters or underground streams, are a part of the wa-
ters referred to in the Constitution as a natural want."2 13 The court
continued with a statement of its judicial policy regarding ground-
water use that seems to acknowledge the tributary groundwater
doctrine:
Such [underground] waters are as much a part of the hydrologic cycle as the
flow of water in a river or stream. It is true that such waters are not concen-
trated as in a river nor do they move with the velocity of a river, but they do
percolate through underground formations and have the same source and ter-
mination as surface water flowing in a river. Underground waters are a part
of the source of water supply to a growing population and an expanding econ-
omy the same as the surface waters flowing in a live stream on the surface of
the ground. Because of the ever-increasing demands for water control of un-
derground waters as well as the flow of rivers and streams, it is becoming
more important and extremely necessary that regulation and control of all
sources of water supply be attained. Without any declaration of public policy
as to the use of underground waters other than the constitutional declaration
that they are a natural want, we adhere to the rule that such waters must be
reasonably used for a beneficial purpose without waste. It is axiomatic that
waters which flow beyond the points of use to the sea are lost and constitute a
form of waste, which is against public policy.
2 1 4
The court then turned to a consideration of groundwater rights, ac-
knowledging that Nebraska had adopted the reasonable use rule,
which prohibited nonoverlying uses (including transportation to dis-
tant lands) if other overlying landowners were harmed thereby. The
court then concluded that in this case, where there was no injury to
other overlying owners, "no reason exists for not permitting the use of
[underground] waters for a public and beneficial purpose which would
be otherwise lost."215
The court then distinguished its holding from Osterman:
That case involved a diversion of the natural flow of the Platte River into the
watersheds of the Republican and Blue Rivers. The taking of the water there
212. Id. at 799, 140 N.W.2d at 636.
213. Id. at 799, 140 N.W.2d at 636 (referring to NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4). This state-
ment is significant because the court is acknowledging the physical (and perhaps
legal) differences between percolating groundwater and water in an underground
stream, i.e., subflow.
214. Id. at 799-800, 140 N.W.2d at 636-37.
215. Id. at 801, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
involved would damage the rights of lower appropriators on a river already
over-appropriated. In the instant case, [MUDI is a riparian landowner. No
water is taken directly from the river. There are no appropriators or riparian
owners who are injured by the taking between the well field and the mouth of
the Platte River some 5 miles east .... There is authority that one not dam-
aged cannot raise the question of a diversion of ground water beyond the wa-
tershed. But we choose to decide the question on the ground of reasonable use
and all the factors that enter into such a consideration, including the reasona-
bleness of a watershed diversion, thus preserving the right of the Legislature,
unimpaired, to determine the policy of the state as to underground waters and
the rights of persons in their use. Under the record of this case and the appli-
cations of the declared law in this case, we can find no basis for holding the
diversion from the well field to be unlawful. Under the evidence in this case
the transwatershed diversion was reasonable, for a public purpose, not
against public policy, and in the public interest. 2 16
The court adopted a balancing test and concluded essentially that be-
cause no one would be harmed by the diversion and the water would
otherwise be wasted, the interbasin transfer should be allowed.
The court did not address the issue of whether the groundwater
withdrawn was legally Platte River subflow, and therefore surface
water, which legally would have been subject to Osterman, as objec-
tors urged. However the court was clearly mindful that the ground-
water pumped was induced recharge from the Platte River, stating
that pumping could be maintained only fifteen days under no flow con-
ditions. 2 17 The court may have avoided the subflow issue in order to
avoid explicitly overruling Osterman, which did not occur until Little
Blue 1218 in 1980. However, the court did spend considerable effort in
discussing the transbasin diversion issue, and framed the issue in
terms of harm to surface water and groundwater users in the Platte
River basin. The court also discussed water generally rather than
making artificial distinctions between surface water and ground-
water, and chided the legislature for failing to legally tie the two to-
gether. That the court discussed the issue in terms of interbasin
transfers of surface water as per Osterman rather than as a nonover-
lying use of groundwater further indicates that the court was mindful
that it was dealing with Platte River subflow rather than percolating
water. While some commentators suggest that MUD and section 46-
635 by implication reject the subflow doctrine,2 19 the court does not
explicitly do so, and might in fact be persuaded to adopt the subflow
doctrine if it provided a reasonable method of coordinating surface
water and groundwater rights in a common source.
The dissent stated that the groundwater to be pumped by MUD
was subflow and therefore was subject to the Osterman prohibition
216. Id. at 801-02, 140 N.W.2d at 637.
217. Id. at 787, 140 N.W.2d at 630.
218. 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980).
219. Harnsberger, Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 2, at 223-25.
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against transbasin diversion. 220 If the Osterman prohibition of in-
terbasin surface water transfers had not been present, the MUD court
could have freely characterized the groundwater at issue as subflow.
However, apparently to avoid dealing with Osterman, the MUD court
characterized the groundwater at issue as groundwater and not as
subflow.
C. New Directions in Nebraska Water Policy
The transbasin diversion issue was mooted in 1980, when Oster-
man was overruled in Little Blue Natural Resources District v. Lower
Platte North Natural Resources District.221 Much of the MUD court's
discussion of groundwater rights can be distinguished as dicta, as the
court concluded the MUD well-pumping would neither harm the ap-
pellants' groundwater rights nor their surface water rights. Indeed,
MUD can be seen as the court's suggestion that its adherence to Oster-
man was weakening, and that it would prefer to authorize a trans-
basin diversion of surface water than to have the water flow out of the
state unused. Clearly the MUD decision is no precedent to preclude
adopting the subflow doctrine, should a real conflict between surface
water users and groundwater users come before the court-a condi-
tion not met in the MUD case.
More recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court has clearly signaled
its willingness to adjudicate disputes between competing surface
water users and groundwater users.222 Central Platte involved an ap-
plication for a Platte river instream flow appropriation by the Central
Platte NRD ("CPNRD"). The instream flow application was opposed
by the state of Wyoming on several grounds. One issue raised by Wyo-
ming was that there was insufficient streamflow in the Platte for the
instream appropriation, because 100 to 200 cubic feet per second of
flow was needed to recharge alluvial aquifers depleted by irrigators.
In essence, Wyoming contended that the 100 to 200 cfs of streamflow
had already been appropriated by groundwater pumpers and there-
fore was not legally available for CPNRD's instream appropriation.
To this novel argument, the Nebraska Supreme Court responded:
To the extent that ground water will be withdrawn in the future, this ground
water remains, at the present, unappropriated water. In part II(l)(a)(i) of this
opinion, we held that for purposes of an instream flow application, surface
water which had not been diverted from the Platte River for a beneficial use
constituted unappropriated water. It logically follows that ground water
which has not been removed also constitutes unappropriated water. We
220. Metro. Util. Dist., 179 Neb. at 804, 140 N.W.2d at 638-39 (Spencer, J.,
dissenting).
221. 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980). See Aiken, supra note 200, at 54-55.
222. Central Platte Natural Res. Dist. v. Wyoming, 245 Neb. 439, 513 N.W.2d 847
(1994).
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therefore hold that the director was not obliged to reduce the historic flow
records to account for future ground water depletions.
2 2 3
This statement suggests that groundwater may be appropriated simi-
lar to surface water appropriation, a statement consistent with the
subflow doctrine. The court then went on to state:
We note that the relative rights of those using ground water and those using
surface water are often unclear. The courts can begin to give outlines and
shape to these rights, but only in a case-by-case, piecemeal fashion, and only
when those rights are brought into direct conflict. Wyoming's evidence re-
garding ground water depletion does not establish a direct conflict, but,
rather, an anticipated conflict. This anticipated conflict is best resolved by the
policy-based decision making process that is the province of our Legislature.
In fact, the Legislature has recently created a system whereby public water
suppliers-municipalities, water districts, irrigation districts, and the like-
can apply for appropriation rights and thus secure their priority.
2 2 4
The court continued: "It is the Legislature, and not the courts, which
can paint a water rights picture with broad strokes and bold colors. It
is to the Legislature that Wyoming must direct its argument regard-
ing future groundwater depletion."2 2 5 The Central Platte court clearly
stated that it would establish legal rules to deal with direct conflicts
between surface water and groundwater users, if there are no gov-
erning statutes. The court's statement suggests that it would at least
be willing to consider applying appropriation concepts-such as the
subflow doctrine and priority-in resolving such conflicts.
D. External Pressures
While the Nebraska Supreme Court was edging toward adopting
the subflow doctrine, external forces were moving Nebraska water of-
ficials and legislators toward implementing at least a limited version
of the tributary groundwater doctrine if not completely embracing the
doctrine itself. The first major push came from the power relicensing
of Kingsley Dam (Lake McConaughy) on the Platte River; the second
came in the Kansas v. Nebraska litigation regarding the Republican
River Compact. 22 6
223. Id. at 451, 513 N.W.2d at 857.
224. Id. at 451, 513 N.W.2d at 857-58. The court referred to induced recharge appro-
priation statutes. See 1993 Neb. Laws 301, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233, -235,
-235.01-.04 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
225. Central Platte, 245 Neb. at 451-52, 513 N.W.2d at 858.
226. Earlier water conflicts impacting Nebraska that involved tributary groundwater
is the Kansas v. Colorado litigation over the Arkansas River compact, and the
Nebraska v. Wyoming litigation over the North Platte River decree. Regarding
the Arkansas River litigation, see Glennon & Maddock, Stream/Aquifer Interac-
tions, supra note 7, at 22-63 to -68; regarding the North Platte River litigation,
see id. at 22-69 to -71. The Glennon and Maddock article also briefly mentions
the pending Republican River litigation and the Platte River endangered species
issues. Regarding the Republican River, see id. at 22-68 to -69, 22-71 to -72; re-
garding Platte River endangered species issues, see id. at 22-74 to -75.
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The Platte River endangered species issues began to surface in the
early 1980s when the Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation
District ("CNPPID") and the Nebraska Public Power District
("NPPD") began the process of obtaining another fifty-year federal hy-
dropower license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC").227 Project relicensing activities achieved a multistate di-
mension, and the Platte River Cooperative Agreement was signed by
Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, and the federal government on July 1,
1997.228 Under the agreement, the states pledge, among other things,
to provide additional water for endangered species habitat protec-
tion.2 29 A substantial portion of that water will come through
purchasing or leasing water from Platte valley irrigators in Nebraska,
obligating Nebraska to develop the water marketing policies it lacked.
Legislative Bill 962 ("LB 962"), enacted in 2004, does provide new
water marketing authorities. 230 The other major requirement from
the Cooperative Agreement is the "no new depletions" requirement.
Any water use initiated after July 1, 1997, is, in effect, junior to the
Cooperative Agreement's endangered species water requirements. 23 1
This includes wells (i.e., tributary wells) as well as stream diversions.
So, the Cooperative Agreement requires the State of Nebraska to be-
gin monitoring tributary groundwater withdrawals junior to the Coop-
erative Agreement and regulating those withdrawals to prevent
interference with habitat flows. If Nebraska does not meet its obliga-
tions under the Cooperative Agreement, the State risks making all
Platte River water uses subject to endangered species streamflow re-
quirements, not just those junior to the Cooperative Agreement. Co-
operative Agreement failure also jeopardizes the operating licenses for
Kingsley, which in turn could jeopardize Platte Valley irrigation and
power production.
The Nebraska Unicameral has responded. 2 32 Natural Resources
Districts ("NRDs"), who have broad groundwater management respon-
sibilities under Nebraska groundwater law,233 in 1998 were author-
ized under Legislative Bill 108 ("LB 108") to regulate (in effect)
tributary wells in order to protect streamflow. 2 34 Even more dramati-
227. See generally J. David Aiken, Balancing Endangered Species Protection and Irri-
gation Water Rights: The Platte River Cooperative Agreement, 3 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RES. J. 119, 137-39 (1999).
228. Id. at 142-46.
229. Id. at 146-47.
230. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-290 to -294.05 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
231. Aiken, supra note 227, at 147-48.
232. Id. at 156-57.
233. See Aiken, supra note 7, at 960-67.
234. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-740 (Cum. Supp. 2004), formerly codified at id. § 46-656.26.
Nebraska statutes do not define the term "hydrologically connected ground
water." See id. § 46-706. However, it is clear from the statute that the term has
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cally, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") under
the 1998 act was authorized to regulate groundwater development
and use interfering with streamflow in violation of interstate com-
pacts, decrees or agreements if NRDs had not acted or their actions
were inadequate. 2 35 The LB 108 authority has been expanded by LB
962, which authorizes the DNR to designate river basins as either
fully appropriated or overappropriated. 23 6 Basin designation estab-
lishes an immediate halt on well-drilling and new appropriations. 2 37
The DNR, in cooperation with the affected NRDs, will develop an inte-
grated management plan ("IMP") to insure compliance with interstate
decrees, compacts or agreements. 238 A management objective for
overappropriated basins or sub-basins will be to close any water sup-
ply gap.2 3 9 Plans will be implemented in ten-year increments. 2 40 Be-
ginning on January 1, 2006, the DNR will annually survey remaining
basins, including the basin's "hydrologically connected" groundwater,
to determine whether the basin should be designated as fully
appropriated.2 4 1
The IMP regulatory authorities are basically carried over from the
1998 law. IMPs may rely on a number of voluntary measures as well
as the surface water and groundwater regulatory controls authorized
by the 1998 integrated water management statutes. Among the au-
thorized groundwater controls are groundwater allocations (e.g., with-
drawal limits), pumping rotation, reducing irrigated acres, and
incentive programs (e.g., paying farmers not to irrigate).24 2 Surface
water controls include reasonable conservation practices and other
reasonable restrictions. 2 43 If NRDs and the DNR disagree regarding
IMP requirements, the dispute will be submitted to an Interrelated
Water Review Board appointed by the Governor for resolution. 2 44 If
NRDs decline to regulate groundwater users, the DNR can do so, in-
stead, if approved by the Interrelated Water Review Board.24 5 These
for all practical purposes the same meaning as tributary groundwater. For back-
ground on LB 108, see Mossman, supra note 111.
235. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-656.50-.51 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002), repealed by
2004 Neb. Laws 962, § 119.
236. Id. § 46-713 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
237. Id. § 46-714.
238. Id. § 46-715(3)(b), (4)(d)(i).
239. Id. § 46-715(4)(d)(v).
240. Id. § 46-715(4)(d)(iii).
241. Id. § 46-713(1)(a).
242. Id. §§ 46-715(2), -739.
243. Id. §§ 46-715(2), -716.
244. Id. § 46-719(2).
245. Id. § 46-719(4).
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authorities will also be utilized by the DNR in implementing the set-
tlement of the Republican River Compact litigation. 246
It may be helpful to briefly sketch how the NRDs and the DNR
may use the LB 962 IMP authorities to deal Republican and Platte
River tributary groundwater issues. For the Republican, let us briefly
compare the general case for interstate water rights administration 2 4 7
with and without tributary well-pumping. In the simple surface-
water-only case (no tributary groundwater pumping), when the down-
stream state is not getting its full supply of water, it notifies the up-
stream state and (ideally) junior appropriators in the upstream state
are subject to priority administration (i.e., administratively ordered to
stop diverting streamflow) until the downstream state is receiving its
full allocation. Unless the water users in the downstream state are
hundreds of miles from the junior surface appropriators in the up-
stream state, issuing closing orders to the junior appropriators will
result in a water supply improvement to the downstream state in a
timely fashion, usually in a few days or less. 248
Tributary groundwater pumping complicates this simple system.
First, the streamflow depletions are not obvious, as they occur under-
ground: there is less water in the stream but there is no surface diver-
sion indicating where the missing water has gone. Second, there is a
time lag that may stretch to decades between tributary well-pumping
and the resulting streamflow depletion.249 So, subjecting junior tribu-
tary wells to priority administration will not result in a timely in-
crease in streamflow to the downstream state, unless all the tributary
wells are subflow wells. Closing down junior subflow wells is likely to
increase streamflow in a matter of days or weeks. However, closing
tributary wells may not increase streamflows for months, years or de-
cades. So, the states must estimate in advance the annual quantity
246. The litigation was settled December 16, 2002. Information regarding the settle-
ment is available at the DNR website, http://www.dnr.state.ne.us/legal/kan-
sasvs.html (last visited June 28, 2004). Information regarding LB 962
implementation is available at http://www.dnr.state.ne.us/watertaskforce/
watertaskforce.html (last visited June 28, 2004).
247. For simplicity's sake we will consider only irrigation water uses, which would
constitute well over ninety percent of Republican and Platte basin water con-
sumptive uses. The "general case" is specified here for simplicity and to avoid a
detailed enquiry into how the Republican River Compact has been administered
in the past and will be administered in the future under the compact litigation
settlement-a very interesting topic that is well beyond the scope of this Article
(but which merits its own separate examination). See Aaron M. Popelka, Note,
The Republican River Dispute: An Analysis of the Parties' Compact Interpretation
and Final Settlement Stipulation, 83 NEB. L. REV. 596 (2004).
248. In State ex. rel Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 171-72, 292 N.W. 239, 245 (1940),
the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that water flowed down the Platte River at
approximately twenty-five miles per day.
249. For a helpful discussion of the lag between tributary groundwater withdrawal
and the resulting reduction in streamflow, see Grant, supra note 12, at 74-80.
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that tributary well withdrawals deplete streamflow into the down-
stream state that the downstream state was entitled to, and in what
month and year those depletions occur, so that the upstream state
knows how much water it must replace and when those replacements
must occur to make the downstream state whole.
How could Nebraska use the LB 962 authorities to deal with this
situation? In the short term, the DNR could purchase senior surface
appropriations in Nebraska to reduce Nebraska surface water use in
order to increase streamflows into Kansas. The DNR and NRDs
might also consider ordering reduced pumping from subflow wells to
increase streamflows into Kansas. In the longer term, significant re-
ductions in tributary groundwater pumping should someday stabilize
and perhaps even reduce subsequent streamflow depletions. Purchas-
ing and retiring groundwater irrigation rights may ultimately be re-
quired in order to reduce tributary groundwater withdrawals
sufficiently to control streamflow depletion effects. In the future, the
DNR may purchase storage appropriations from Nebraska irrigators
in wet years and save the water to meet Kansas water delivery re-
quirements in dry years. Nebraska may need to negotiate purchases
of water rights in Kansas where there is insufficient Republican River
surface water available from Nebraska irrigators to meet Kansas
water delivery requirements. Many of these alternatives are likely to
be resisted by groundwater irrigators, and the DNR may need to re-
sort to section 46-719 to resolve policy disputes between NRDs and the
DNR.
LB 962's implementation on the Platte will be slightly different.
Here there are two general water management objectives: (1) to pro-
vide replacement water for streamflow depletion resulting from post-
Cooperative Agreement wells and (2) to increase streamflows to im-
prove endangered species habitat. Streamflow depletion from tribu-
tary wells will need to be quantified, and surface water rights
purchased to compensate for the depletion amount that harms endan-
gered species. Additional surface water rights may be purchased (or
leased) to provide additional water for endangered species flows. The
availability of large quantities of stored water in Lake McConaughy
provides greater flexibility on the Platte than on the Republican,
where water storage is significantly less.
LB 962 treats surface water and groundwater rights differently.
Section 46-716 authorizes the DNR to impose conservation require-
ments on surface water appropriators in an IMP. Section 46-739 IMP
groundwater controls include allocation, pumping rotation, irrigated
acre reduction, and best management practices. The surface water ir-
rigation conservation requirements are probably comparable to the
groundwater best management practices, where the same crops are
grown but less irrigation water is used. However, the pumping rota-
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tion and irrigated acre reduction authorities for groundwater irriga-
tors have no explicit surface water parallel. This may reflect the more
flexible and less defined nature of a Nebraska groundwater right. It
may also reflect the hydrologic fact that during dry periods, streams
carry less water and surface water irrigation is reduced through prior-
ity administration: junior appropriators are issued closing orders for
the benefit of senior appropriators, and those junior appropriators be-
come dryland farmers (unless they have irrigation wells, as many of
them do). But in these same periods, groundwater irrigators simply
pump more water to compensate for the reduced precipitation. In the
short term, there is no natural check on groundwater irrigation in the
same way that reduced streamflows on fully appropriated streams
provide a natural check on surface water irrigation.2 50
One unresolved policy issue is whether those irrigating with tribu-
tary wells should be individually financially responsible for providing
replacement water to offset the streamflow depletion attributable to
their tributary well. The individual irrigator responsibility approach
is followed in Colorado25 1 but is not required by LB 962. The costs of
replacing streamflow lost to tributary well-pumping in the Republican
and Platte basins has not been formally estimated, but doubtless will
cost millions of dollars in time. At some point, an increasingly urban
Unicameral may decide that tributary groundwater pumpers, rather
than Nebraska taxpayers at large, should bear some or all of those
costs.
LB 962 is a long-overdue step forward, authorizing the DNR to
take whatever steps are necessary to comply with the Platte River Co-
operative Agreement and the Republican River compact litigation set-
tlement. While LB 962 stops short of establishing an explicit
tributary groundwater system, it does so implicitly in basins desig-
nated as overappropriated. Hydrologically connected groundwater
withdrawals may be reduced, new well-drilling stopped, and surface
water rights retired. Certainly the DNR and NRDs have a wide range
of management alternatives to achieve a more sustainable water sys-
tem in overappropriated basins.
E. Spear T Litigation
On February 26, 2003, the Spear T Ranch filed a complaint against
upstream tributary groundwater irrigators alleging that the defend-
ants were depleting the flow of Pumpkin Creek, of which the plaintiff
was an appropriator. 25 2 The district court dismissed the complaint,
250. See the discussion of Hudson v. Dailey, supra notes 150-53 and the accompany-
ing text.
251. For a discussion of how the Colorado replacement water system works, see
MacDonnell, supra note 111.
252. Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Spear T Ranch v. Knaub (No. A-03-000789).
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and the plaintiff appealed. The appeal was argued before the Ne-
braska Supreme Court on March 3, 2004 and reargued September 8,
2004. The court has yet to rule on the case as of the time of this
publication.
The main issue before the court is whether the case, one of first
impression in Nebraska, can proceed to trial. If the defendants' tribu-
tary well-pumping interferes with the plaintiffs surface appropria-
tions, are the defendants liable? Given the court's observations on
surface water-groundwater interrelationships in Central Platte, the
court clearly seems ready to adjudicate tributary groundwater dis-
putes, such as the one posed by Spear T. At one time, it might have
seemed quite a stretch to go from MUD's apparent rejection of the sub-
flow doctrine to adopting the tributary groundwater doctrine. How-
ever, LB 962 certainly makes that an easier judicial step to take, given
the statute's broad authorities for the DNR to prohibit the drilling of
new tributary wells and NRD/DNR authorities to regulate withdraw-
als from existing tributary wells to protect streamflow.
The Nebraska Supreme Court's Spear T ruling could have
profound implications for implementation of LB 962, and the associ-
ated compliance with the Republican River Compact litigation settle-
ment and the Platte River Cooperative Agreement. For example, if
the court follows MUD in ignoring the hydrologic connection between
surface water and groundwater, tributary groundwater pumpers (in-
cluding those pumping subflow wells) will then be able to argue that
their regulation under LB 962 for the benefit of protecting streamflow
is illegal. Similarly, if the court follows the Restatement (Second) of
Torts approach of limiting judicial recognition of the hydrologic con-
nection to subflow,253 non-subflow tributary well pumpers again will
be able to argue that their regulation by LB 962 to protect streamflow
is illegal. In effect, in order to bolster the constitutionality of LB 962
in the future, the Nebraska Supreme Court should embrace the tribu-
tary groundwater doctrine. The court need not make the important
factual determination of where the dividing line between tributary
and nontributary groundwater exists, 254 as that boundary is likely to
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1)(c) (1979).
254. Colorado statutes establish when groundwater is not tributary groundwater.
Nontributary groundwater is groundwater (outside of a designated groundwater
basin-see MacDonnell, supra note 111) that, when withdrawn, does not deplete
the flow of a natural stream within 100 years, "greater than one-tenth of one
percent of the annual rate of withdrawal." CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5)
(2003). For example, a well pumping 200 acre-feet per year for 100 years (20,000
acre-feet total) would be a tributary if it depleted streamflow more than 0.20
acre-feet per year within the 100 years. This is the most expansive definition of
tributary (or hydrologically-connected) groundwater. It is likely that the DNR,
when defining what constitutes hydrologically-connected groundwater, will be
significantly less inclusive. On the Platte, NRDs and the DNR are using a "28/
40" streamflow depletion test. If twenty-eight percent of the water withdrawn
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fluctuate with study, additional information, and experience. But
wells that have clearly contributed to current stream depletion should
at least be presumed to be tributary wells. Failing to adopt the tribu-
tary groundwater doctrine could cast a significant constitutional
doubt upon regulation of hydrologically connected wells under LB 962,
something the court surely would wish to avoid. Rejecting the tribu-
tary groundwater doctrine does not necessarily make LB 962 uncon-
stitutional, but it surely would strengthen the legal hand of
groundwater users resisting LB 962 groundwater controls aimed at
protecting streamflow.
While the Nebraska Supreme Court will take judicial notice of the
policies underlying LB 962, the statute does not resolve the legal issue
posed in the Spear T case. LB 962 does not establish a framework for
resolving the individual competing claims of overlying owners and se-
nior surface appropriators. So, any judicial guidance will need to be
inferred from general provisions of the statute.
LB 962 adopts the tributary groundwater doctrine only to the mini-
mum extent necessary to bring Nebraska into legal compliance with
the state's interstate water obligations. LB 962 requires IMPs, the
joint NRD-DNR surface water and groundwater controls, as a mini-
mum (1) to assure compliance with interstate water obligations 25 5 and
(2) to protect existing surface waters (as well as induced recharge
wells256) from post-LB 962 hydrologically connected wells.2 57 This
latter provision suggests that pre-LB 962 wells are subject to regula-
tions to protect surface water only to the extent necessary to bring
Nebraska into compliance with interstate water obligations. This po-
sition is buttressed by section 46-715(4)(d)(v), which requires that the
ultimate objective of an IMP is to bring an overappropriated basin into
fully appropriated status. Section 46-715(4)(c) requires the IMP to
identify "the overall difference between the current [overappropriated]
and fully appropriated levels of [water] development." In other words,
the IMP must identify how much basin water use must be reduced in
order to move the basin from being overappropriated to being fully
from a well that is pumped continuously for forty years would otherwise have
reached the stream, the well is a tributary well. Personal Communication with
Mr. Steve Gaul, Supervisor, Planning & Assistance Div., Neb. Dep't of Natural
Res. (Aug. 20, 2004). The 28/40 test is less inclusive than the Colorado 0.1/100
test and may not be inclusive enough to establish a truly sustainable policy that
would protect streamflow from tributary groundwater withdrawals. However,
the 28/40 test represents a good start, upon which a more inclusive standard can
be based in the future.
255. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-715(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
256. In Nebraska, public water suppliers can obtain surface water appropriations for
induced recharge wells. Id. §§ 46-233, -235, -235.01-.04 (Reissue 1998 & Cum.
Supp. 2002). Such wells are essentially treated as surface water diversions.
257. Id. § 46-715(3)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
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appropriated. While the term "overappropriated" is not defined, 258 a
fully appropriated basin is defined by 46-713(3) as follows:
A river basin, subbasin, or reach shall be deemed fully appropriated if the
department [of Natural Resources] determines that then-current uses of hy-
drologically connected surface water and ground water in the river basin, sub-
basin or reach cause or will in the reasonably foreseeable future cause (a) the
surface water supply to be insufficient to sustain over the long term the bene-
ficial or useful purposes for which existing natural flow or storage appropria-
tions were granted and the beneficial or useful purposes for which, at the time
of approval, any existing instream appropriation was granted, (b) the stream-
flow to be insufficient to sustain over the long term the beneficial uses of wells
constructed in aquifers dependent on recharge from the river or stream in-
volved, or (c) reduction in the flow of a river or stream sufficient to cause non-
compliance by Nebraska with an interstate compact or decree, other formal
state contract or agreement, or applicable state or federal laws [emphasis
added].
This fully appropriated definition reads like a good definition of an
overappropriated basin. A fully appropriated basin would better seem
to be defined as one where the use of hydrologically-connected water
would not harm existing surface water rights, or cause the surface
water supply to be sufficient to satisfy existing natural flow and stor-
age appropriations. If this were the case, then groundwater irrigation
would be reduced through allocation, irrigated acreage reductions,
and water right buyouts; surface water irrigation would be reduced
through water conservation practices and water right buyouts. Under
these circumstances, a better argument could be made that LB 962 is
consistent with the tributary groundwater theory.
But this is not what LB 962 says. Thus, designation of fully appro-
priated basins can cap groundwater development by banning new well
installation, but restoring surface water supplies to sufficiency in or-
der to protect existing surface appropriations is not required by LB
962. The statute does adopt the tributary groundwater doctrine only
insofar as necessary to meet interstate water obligations but no fur-
ther. It is a short step, however, from LB 962's current provisions to a
future version that would identify, for example, how much tributary
groundwater withdrawals would need to be reduced in order to satisfy
existing surface water rights, not just on the Republican River in Kan-
sas but on Nebraska streams as well. While this is a step the Unicam-
eral has not taken, it is the obvious next logical step.
The Spear T court can usefully nudge the Unicameral in that sen-
sible direction by holding junior tributary groundwater users liable for
streamflow depletions harming senior surface appropriators. Such a
holding would not necessarily require that all groundwater disputes
(such as well interference conflicts between neighboring wells) be re-
258. Overappropriated basins are essentially basins where NRDs had established
well-drilling moratoria in response to interstate water obligations. Id. § 46-
713(4)(a)-(b).
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solved on the basis of priority, and would not mean that junior tribu-
tary wells would be shut down in the largely futile attempt to increase
streamflows during a single irrigation season.2 59 However, junior
tributary well owners should be liable for providing replacement
water to the senior surface appropriator, which could even be in the
form of an irrigation well. Alternatively, the junior tributary well
owners could be liable in damages. Such a ruling would at last bring
Nebraska common law into conformance with hydrologic reality, and
would accelerate the evolution of Nebraska groundwater policy to-
wards one that achieves a long-term balance between surface water
and groundwater use that protects streamflows and surface water
rights. The alternative is to continue in the willful ignorance of hydro-
logic reality, and relegate the public rights and values in flowing
streams to whatever is left over when the irrigation wells have fin-
ished for the season.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "A river is more than
an amenity, it is a treasure."2 6o Nebraska's rivers are a crucial part of
our landscape and natural heritage, to be protected and passed on to
our children and to their children. Groundwater irrigation has often
been referred to as Nebraska's buried treasure, and its exploitation
has long benefitted the state's agricultural economy. However, experi-
ence has taught us that there are limits to sustainable groundwater
use, limits that clearly have been exceeded in the Republican and the
Platte River basins. In grudging response, LB 962 acknowledges that
groundwater controls must be established to protect senior Republi-
can River surface appropriators in Kansas, and to protect Platte River
endangered species. Justice demands that the same protections be
provided to senior surface appropriators in Nebraska, wherever they
may be, as the necessary next step in protecting a crucial element in
our state's natural heritage. Failure to adopt the tributary ground-
water doctrine will enable a policy that recognizes the public values of
streamflows only when absolutely forced to do so. Such a crabbed and
unsustainable resource policy would be a poor legacy for our children.
259. For a discussion of how the Colorado replacement water system works, see
MacDonnell, supra note 111.
260. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
